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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES - FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY,
AND THE PARIS CONVENTION:
CAVEAT INVESTOR
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the growth of multinational corporations (MNC's),
has been a source of increasing concern in the international community. 2 In an effort to achieve economic independence from these major
1. Much of the literature dealing with foreign investment, transfer of
technology, and codes of conduct distinguishes between MNC's, multinational enterprises (MNE's), transnational corporations (TNC's), and transnational enterprises
(TNE's). The current mode of reference to business entities is TNE. United Nations
use of this terminology is motivated by the desire to encompass more types of business
entities within a single term. Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the
Binding or Voluntary Nature of InternationalCodes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1978). For some scholars, the word
"transnational" is more exact than "multinational" since it better conveys the notion
that these firms operate across national borders. Danifio, Regulating the Multinational:
A Note on the Divestment Myth, 10 LAW. AMERICAS 385 (1978). See also United Nations Secretariat, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on
International Relations 25 (1974) (U.N. Publication Sales No. 74.II.A.5). Others
prefer different terminology in order to convey different ideas. See, e.g., R. TINDALL,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 10 (1975); see also UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD

DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (1974); Weston, "The Global Corporation:Agent of Change"-A
Symposium, 6 J.INT'L L. & ECON. 211, 211 (1971-1972); United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development, Guidelines for the Study of the Transfer of Technology 1,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/9 (1972) (U.N. Publication Sales No. E. 72.II.D.19)
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines]; Behrman, The Multinational Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Governmental Reactions, 6 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215, 220 (1971-1972); C.
KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 179-85 (1969); Fatouros, The Computer
and the Mud Hut: Notes on Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countries, 10
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325 (1971). Whatever terminology is used, it is generally
understood that the terminology refers to the operations of the subject entity and not
to its legal status. Id. at 331.
This comment will use only the term MNC and such term will be understood to refer
to any business entity operating from its home base across national borders and whose
transnational dealings are more than de minimus in relation to its total operations.
2. The MNC has caused much concern due to its operations and characteristics.
MNC's, generally large and influential entities, have been perceived as posing a threat
to the economic, political, and social sovereignty of LDC's. Danifio, supra note 1,at
385. LDC's perceive that MNC's, in making managerial decisions and in operating
their enterprises, attempt to achieve least cost production; they do this by coordinating
their affiliates and gaining control over local enterprise. This control, however, is exercised for the benefit of the MNC, not the host country. Id. at 391, 393.
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suppliers of technology, many lesser developed countries (LDC's) have
enacted stringent investment and transfer of technology codes. 3 The
proliferation of such types of regulation has become a thorn in the
relations between developed and underdeveloped nations. These codes
and laws have been enacted, however, to rectify perceived inequities
and abuses fostered by MNC's. The transfer of necessary knowledge
and technology to LDC's has been accompanied by a multitude of
restrictions on their use; oftentimes economic resources are depleted in
return for inappropriate technologies. 4 Large scale transfers of
technology from MNC's have had the effect of inhibiting the development of indigenous technology creating a danger of perpetual
technological dependence upon developed countries.'
In addition, there is a prevailing opinion to the effect that MNC's have, in fact,
achieved a monopoly over know-how and technology. For example, patents granted by
LDC's and developed countries are granted mostly to corporations. In LDC's, 84% of
the patents granted are granted to foreigners, in particular to MNC's. United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer
of Technology to Developing Countries 39, 41, 42, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19/Rev.
1 (1975) (U.N. Publication Sales No. E.75.II.D.6) [hereinafter cited as The Role of the
Patent System]. Technology, the mainspring of development, is difficult to acquire;
when acquired, it is often acquired on unequal terms. See generally Ewing, Transfer
and Development of Technology: The Problem of Developing Countries in Perspective, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1977). See also United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developing Countries 11, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TT/AS/5 (1978) (U.N. Publication Sales No.
E.78.II.D.15) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Handbook]; United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, National Approaches to the Acquisition of Technology,
U.N. Doc. ID/187 (1978) (U.N. Publication Sales No. E.78.II.B.7) [hereinafter cited
as National Approaches]. Pointed discussions of this problem may be found in Von
Mehren & Gold, Multinational Corporations: Conflicts and Controls, I1 STAN. J.
INT'L STUD. 1 (1976), and Perlmutter, Perplexing Routes to MNE Legitimacy: Codes
of Conductfor Technology Transfer, 11 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 169 (1976).
3. E.g., Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks, [Dec. 31, 1972], D.O.; Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment [March 9, 1973], 317 D.O. No. 7,
at 5; Decision 24 of the Andean Commission, Standard Regime for Treatment of
Foreign Capitals and for Treatment of Marks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, [Dec.
31, 1970], Registro Oficial No. 264, at 1 (Equador), reprinted in 10 Int'l Legal Mat'ls
910 (1969); Regulations on Foreign Investments in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
Decree No. 115/CP (Apr. 18, 1977).
4. Certain technologies transferred to LDC's may be inappropriate either due to
market conditions or due to the relative availability of various factors of production. A
LDC may have a comparative advantage in technologies utilizing labor but not those
utilizing capital. Guidelines, supra note 1, at 6.
For a list of typical clauses found in a technology licensing agreement (some of
which are extremely restrictive), see Finnegan, InternationalPatent and Know-How
Licensing: The Rules of the Game, in CURRENT TRENDS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LICENSING-PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, TRADE SECRETS, KNOW-HOW, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 113 (1975). See also Coonrod, The United Nations Code of Con-

duct for TransnationalCorporations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 273, 274-85 (1977).
5. See notes 35-46 and accompanying text infra.
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Investment and technology codes, however, are double-edged
swords. While alleviating technological dependence and controlling the
depletion of economic resources, these laws have, in some instances,

created a disincentive for potential investors to invest their capital in
the enacting state.6 MNC's acting as investors within LDC's have produced ample benefits. New technology is imported; employment and
training are provided for the labor force; new and necessary products
are imported. Some commentators have concluded that the disincentive thus created will greatly reduce benefits enjoyed by LDC's as well
as by developed nations.'
The proliferation of these codes of conduct has had an impact on
the development of international law. Old norms have been brought
into question. Treaty obligations and relations have been affected. 8
Concepts of jurisdiction 9 and compensation for expropriated property' ° under international law have not been immune from attack. Many
LDC's consider that there now exists a new international economic
order justifying their sometimes harsh enactments." In particular, naprotection for intellectual property
tional and international systems of 12
have been subject to severe attack.
6.

See, e.g., Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanization, and the New International
TEXAS INT'L L.J. 289, 304-05

Economic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13

(1978).
7. Id. at 305.
8. See notes 136-207 and accompanying text infra.
9. There is a growing feeling, prevalent especially among LDC's, that transfer of
technology disputes are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the host country. E.g.,
Report of the Intergovernmental Experts on an International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology on its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/I1, Annex II
(Nov. 23, 1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 453, 472-73 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the Intergovernmental Experts]. Compare Report of the Intergovernmental Experts with Report of the Intergovernmental Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology on its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc.

TD/AC.I/1l, Annex III (Nov. 23, 1977), reprinted in 17

INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS

453,

480-81 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 8, 10, 18 (1965); Akehurst, Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, [1972-1973]

46

BRIT.

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 189.

10. Compare G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) -, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962) and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), with Domke, Foreign
Nationalizations,55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 604-10 (1961), Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility
of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 553
(1961), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 185-192 (1965).
11. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
, U.N. Doc. A/9559
)
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, __ U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
(1974).
12. Id.; UNCTAD Handbook, supra note 2, at 47-51; The Role of the Patent
System, supra note 2. See also Greer, The Case Against Patent Systems in Less-

8 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 223 (1973-1974).
Developed
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American entrepreneurs, however, continue to invest abroad.
Three different types of investment strategy are, in fact, employed.
These types of investment may be classified as investment in an industry in an LDC, export of goods to LDC's, and the licensing of
know-how to local industry.' 3 In order to determine what, if any, type
of investment is appropriate in a given LDC, the risks, costs, and
benefits of each type of investment must be weighed. Thus, as well as
assessing monetary costs and benefits (profits), it is necessary for investors to ascertain the degree of protection granted them under local
and international law. Local and international law, however, are both
reflective of existing attitudes in LDC's as well as social and economic
conditions therein.'" In order to avoid friction with local authorities, it
is incumbent upon investors to understand these attitudes and conditions. Since local conditions may, in some instances, affect international law, a further justification for discussion of these conditions is
presented. International obligations are greatly respected, though not
universally agreed upon.'" Thus, international law may be an effective
limit on local legislation. As international law, local attitudes, and
local conditions change, local law may be expected to reflect these
changes.
An understanding of the problems and attitudes of underdeveloped
countries thus forms the basis for harmonious relations, as well as an
ability to predict developments in domestic and international law. In
view of the materiality of local conditions and attitudes, as well as
domestic and international law, in investment decisionmaking, an in
depth exploration of these areas is indicated. Therefore, an analysis of
the problems and attitudes of LDC's will be presented in order to provide a basis for understanding, as well as to provide a background for
discussion of relevant international law. An example of local investment and technology law will be presented in the form of a discussion
of Mexican law. Where helpful, comparisons to the law of other
LDC's will be provided. Based upon these discussions, the relevant international law will be portrayed and explained. The effect and relationship of the aforementioned subjects on international law will be
discussed. In particular, attention will be directed to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property' 6 and the Convention on
National Approaches, supra note 2, at 7.
See discussion of rebus sic stantibus, notes 157-87 and accompanying text inThe vitality of the doctrine pacta sunt servanda is evidence
in this respect. See
notes 157-58 and accompanying text infra.
16. Revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923
[hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].

13.
14.
fra.
15.
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the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards." The
Paris Convention, which provides particularly important protections
for investors, will be discussed in depth, as will be proposed revisions
of that Convention.
II.

THE PROBLEMS OF LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The ability to control the mode of development is an important
factor in the growth and economic development of a state. State
economic planning has been a key factor in the development of many
developed states and indeed in the high standards of living in some
LDC's.' 8 The great majority of LDC's have been unable to achieve
high growth rates due, in part, to a form of economic imperialism or
colonialism practiced by MNC's.' 9 Control of key sectors of the
economy by MNC's and restrictive business practices employed by
these entities have stunted the growth rates of LDC's and have im20
peded the achievement of economic goals.
The standard of living in many LDC's is very low. It has been
estimated that in the year 1970 the per capita income of the richest
2
country in the world was more than sixty times that of the poorest. '
Measured by income level, it is evident that most countries in Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America fall into the category of
LDC's.

22

17. Done, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [hereinafter cited as
New York Convention].
18. The development of the Israeli economy, for example, has been due, in part,
to the activity of the Israeli government. While not completely successful in achieving
all the goals set by Israel, centralized planning did contriubte to its trade balance; a
moderate rate of economic growth was also maintained in the period of 1963-1967. D.
HOROWITZ, THE ECONOMICS OF ISRAEL 171-86 (1967). But see B. AKZIN & Y. DROR,
ISRAEL 67-78 (1966).
19. Many MNC's, as well as other foreign investors, license their technology on
what may be considered unjust terms. In so licensing, MNC's may engage in a number
of restrictive business practices. Such practices include the use of tie-in clauses, grantback clauses, territorial divisions, high royalties, licensee estoppel clauses and others.
See Perlmutter, supra note 2, at 178-90.
20. See Joelson & Griffen, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT'L LAW. 5, 6 (1977).
21. D. SNIDER, INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 414-15 (1975). The
per capita income for the year 1970 in the United States was approximately 4,294
dollars, while the per capita income of the poorest country, Malawi, was the equivalent
of seventy United States dollars. Id. at 415.
22. Id. at 414. Many other factors besides income distinguish LDC's from developed
countries. M. MERHAV, TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE, MONOPOLY, AND GROWTH 16
(1969). Leibenstein, a professor of economics at the Univesity of California at
Berkeley, suggests the following as characteristic of underdeveloped countries:
I. Economic
A. General Characteristics
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The problem of underdevelopment has political as well as
economic content. Underdeveloped nations have been poor, sometimes
poorer than they are now. 23 These countries have "not ...just recently awakened from a state of blissful or miserable isolation from the
rest of the world which 'took off' and passed them by." ' 24 Until recently, many of these states have been part of a world-wide economic
system dominated by the advanced countries. Indeed, until thirty years
states had been under the political rule of the adago many of these
25
states.
vanced
The achievement of national sovereignty and independence has
revealed the disparity between the wealth of the developed countries
political goals,
and the LDC's. 26 Discontent has formed the basis for
27
sovereignty.
of
achievement
the
of
result
as a direct
As former members of colonial empires, many of these countries
had little opportunity to absorb the modern skills, know-how, techniques, and institutions which sometimes emerge as the by-product of
1. A high proportion of the population in agriculture usually over seventy
percent;
2. "Absolute over-population" in agriculture; it would be possible to reduce
the number of agricultural workers and not decrease productivity. In other
words, the marginal productivity of each worker, at that point, is de
minimus;

3. Disguised unemployment;
4. Lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture;
5. A low capital to labor ratio;
6. Subsistence level existence;
7. Zero savings for the large mass of the population;
8. Existing savings are achieved by a landholding class whose values are not
conducive to investment;
9. Low agricultural output of protein foods;
10. Consumption of income mainly on food and necessities;
11. Export of food and raw materials;
12. Low volume of trade per capita
13. Poor credit and market facilities and poor housing;
II. Technological and Miscellaneous
1. Low yields of foodstuffs per acre;
2. Insufficient training facilities for the development of skilled labor;
3. Inadequate transportation and communication; and
4. Crude technology.
H.

LEIBENSTEIN, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 40-41

23.

MERHAV, supra

24.

Id.

(1963).

note 22, at 17.

25. Id. at 17-18. Until the end of World War II, several of the Mideast nations
were subject to British domination. The United States also exerted control over the
Philippines during that period.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
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colonialism. 28 MNC's, the products of capitalism, 2 9 may be viewed by
LDC's with suspicion as capitalism may, in the underdeveloped world,
be linked to colonialism. 30 Poverty and backwardness in these coun3
tries may further be equated with their former colonial status. "
Some of the obstacles to growth in LDC's may be formidable indeed. Many LDC's are handicapped by the limited amount and variety
of natural resources available." While not decisive in itself, such a
handicap certainly disadvantages a state." So too, the labor force in
many states may be plagued by illness, illiteracy, indifference, lack of
3'
initiative, and lack of education and technical know-how.
One of the most serious problems, however, is that of
technological paucity and incomplete control over economic
resources. 3 5 The ability to acquire and utilize resources for the national
benefit and growth is, in large part, a function of both control over
economic and natural resources and the state of technology. Output
can be dramatically improved without any change in the factors of
36
Many
production, by applying more appropriate technology.
new
of
advent
the
by
immensely
developed countries have benefited
7
Technology and technological knowand appropriate technology.
how, however, may be monopolized by large MNC's. Legal restrictions embodied in licensing agreements, contracts, or laws relating to
industrial property may and do impede the diffusion of technology to
LDC's.3 8 So too, the monopolistic position of MNC's in the market,
accompanied by the lack of necessity to develop or reveal innovations,
is a cause of technological backwardness. 3 9 MNC participation in in28. Id. at 20. The attack upon MNC's may well be based, in part, upon suspicion
and sensitivity; it may also be an attack upon the symbol of LDC inferiority-MNC's.
29. Id. at 21, 32; J. LEWIS, QUIET CRISIS ININDIA 203 (1962).
30. LEWIS, supra note 29, at 203; MERHAV supra note 22, at 20-21.
31. MERHAV, supra note 22, at 21.
32. SNIDER, supra note 21, at 419.
33. A necessity to import some of these raw materials may further strain the
balance of payments of LDC's; foreign reserves are also typically scarce. Guidelines,
supra note 4, at 6.
34. SNIDER, supra note 21, at 420.
35. Id. at 419, 422. See also Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1; Ewing, UNCTAD and
the Transfer of Technology, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 197 (1976).
36. SNIDER, supra note 21, at 422.

37. Id. For example, in the period 1909-1949, 87.5 percent of the growth of per
capita income in the United States is attributable to technological progress. Ewing,
supra note 35, at 197.
38. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 23-27; Ewing, supra note 35, at 198. For example, if a local licensee is required to grant back ownership of improvements of licensed technology, the host nation will have difficulty in gaining access to the improvement.
39. See, e.g., MERHAV, supra note 22, at 33, 36, 37, 60.
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vestment might also provide the basis for interference in the internal
politics of their host countries, a possibility to which LDC's display
particular sensitivity. 0
One of the reasons that technological dependence has become a
nagging and self-perpetuating problem is that the process of industrialization in developed countries has led to specialization.
Specialization, the province of the advanced countries, implies a
dependence which militates against the independent growth of
LDC's. 4' Catering to large markets requires large firms and economies
of scale. The technology which is available (largely available in
machinery and goods) is adapted to large markets and large scale production typical of advanced countries. 2 Foreign monopolies in the
form of MNC's or subsidiaries develop. 3 Since the domestic market in
LDC's is largely incapable of sustaining large scale competitive industry," economic incentive for innovation is not present. Hence, the
market of LDC's must rely more and more upon techniques and
technology imported from advanced countries. 5 Israeli economist
Meir Merhav, who worked with the United Nations in the late sixties
on the problems of LDC's, stated:
Whatever the ultimate causes may be, the underdeveloped countries depend for their growth on the techniques of the advanced countries and
the consequences of the scales of capacity determined in the latter [advanced states] for the competitive structure in the former [LDC's] are immediately obvious: their narrow markets
cannot sustain more than a few
46
firms in each line of production.
The market structure, industry concentration, and economies of
scale are factors in technological dependence. Technological
dependence and import dependence are problems which have been attacked by LDC's in a number of ways. Technology laws and investment codes have been the means chosen to achieve growth and
technological independence.
The attitudes of LDC's, as well as their former colonial status,
have led to a number of economic problems. New-found expectations
40.

See generally Perlmutter, supra note 2, at 169. See also Charter of Economic

Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, art.
2(b), U.N. Doc. A/9631 [hereinafter cited as CERDS].
41. See MERHAV, supra note 22, at 6, 30-35, 36, 37, 39-60.
42. The technology originates from advanced countries which have large markets.
Id. at 32-33.
43. Id. at 36, 37.
44. Id. at 37.
45. Id. at 30, 33-36.
46. Id. at 37.
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and technological dependence have contributed to the intensity of
these problems. LDC's are apprehensive of foreign involvement in
their economy. These problems and apprehensions have found expression both in international and local law. In particular, the law of
LDC's has responded in dramatic fashion to these problems.
III.

TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS

Regulation of foreign investment is hardly the exclusive province of
LDC's. Many developed countries have enacted laws and regulations
dealing with the screening and regulation of foreign investment.
Canada and Australia are two such countries."' Indeed, the United

States Code contains many provisions relating to foreign investment."
While they are not the only members of the international society to

promulgate restrictive laws, LDC's have, however, enacted regulations
much more extensive in nature than have developed countries.
LDC legislation relating to investment and transfer of technology is
47. United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, National Legislation
and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations 2, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/6
(1978) (U.N. Publication Sales No. E.78.II.A.3) [hereinafter cited as National Legislation].
48. While the United States has not erected many barriers in the way of foreign
investment, some sectors are screened very closely. For example, the United States has
restricted alien investment in the communications sector. 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1976) effectively limits alien investment in radio stations. That section provides that the license required for the operation of a radio station shall not be granted to an alien. Neither
may such a license be granted to the representative of an alien, nor to any foreign corporation wherein an alien is an officer or director; such license may not be granted to
any corporation when an alien owns more than one-fifth of its stock. Finally, no
license may be granted to any corporation which is effectively controlled by an alien influenced corporation. Id. § 310(b).
Congress has also begun a program of studying foreign investment in the United
States. The timing of the program indicates that it was probably enacted in response to
possible investment of petro-dollars by Arab states. See 15 U.S.C. §78b (1976).
In addition, national legislation has also denied to foreign corporations or foreign
controlled United States corporations entry into certain other areas. Ownership of
vessels engaged in coastal traffic, ownership of aircraft used in internal traffic, and
ownership of interests in defense contractors is precluded. Vagts, The United States of
America and the MultinationalEnterprise, in NATIONALISM AND THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 3, 15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The USA and the MNE]. See also Vagts,
The CorporateAlien, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1961).
Some states also maintain restrictions on alien ownership. Especially burdensome is
the common law rule, prevalent in some states, against alien land ownership. A trend,
however, seems to have been established invalidating such restrictions on constitutional
grounds. Equal protection has been invoked as has been the constitutional principle of
federal pre-eminence in international relations. The USA and the MNE, supra, at 16;
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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multi-faceted. The laws generally address such topics of concern as
selection of foreign investment, reserved or restricted sectors of the
economy, and incentive schemes. 4 9 Local laws may limit the types of
enterprises which may be set up and may also limit the equity participation of foreign investors.5 0 Local law frequently requires some
degree of local representation in management 5 ' and may, in some instances, limit expatriate employment in order to provide jobs and
training for local personnel.3 2

Some of the criteria in the screening of investment are contributions to the creation of employment, establishment of needed industries, contributions to the balance of payment problem, and the
production of import substitutes.5 3 If these criteria are substantially
fulfilled, investment is generally permitted; a small but increasing
number of LDC's, however, require eventual majority ownership by
nationals of the host country."
The pattern of investment regulation which predominates in South
American countries involves many features not found in African or
Asian regulation." Some of the typically South American features
are:

56

49. National Legislation, supra note 47, at 3-7. As used in this comment, a reserved sector is a sector of the economy wherein investment is limited to nationals. A
restricted sector is one in which foreign investment is limited in scope, either in equity
ownership or capital contribution.
50.

Id.

51. This is done so that managerial decisions reflect the needs of the host state.
See, e.g., Decision 24 of the Andean Commission, Standard Regime for Treatment of
Foreign Capitals and for Treatment of Marks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties [Dec.
31, 1970], as amended by Decision 37 [June 24, 19711, Decision 37-A [July 17, 1971],
Decision 70 [Feb. 13, 19731, Decision 103 [Oct. 30, 1976], and Decision 109 [Nov. 30,
1976], arts. 1, 36, 50 [hereinafter cited as Decision 24 amended], reprinted in 16 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977). But see Note, Decree No. 115/CP, Apr. 18, 1977, Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 681, 689 (1978).

52.
53.
54.

National Legislation, supra note 47, at 3-7.
Id. See generally National Approaches, supra note 2, at 17-66.
E.g, Decision 24 amended, supra note 51, arts. 28, 30, 31, reprintedin 16
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 152, 161, 162-63 (1977). See also Decree 18900 [June 30, 1971],
18 L.R. 420, 550 (1971), [1971] Compendio 369 (Peru); Murphy, The Andean Common Market and Mexico: A ForeignInvestment Profile, 13 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 307, 312

(1977-1978).
55. The general pattern of African and Asian regulation of foreign investment is
characterized by few restrictions and a greater number of incentives. There is little
discrimination on the basis of the nationality of the investor. There exists some screening of investment insofar as incentives are to be awarded. Sectors are not generally
closed to foreigners and investment ceilings have not been established. Provisions for
compensation in case of nationalization are provided. Some areas of the Middle East
and North Africa have established local participation quotas and discriminate against
foreign investors. National Legislation, supra note 47, at 3-7.
56. Id. at 1-10. See also National Approaches, supra note 2, at 31-63.
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1. Screening of foreign investment on a case-by-case basis;
2. Few incentives;
3. Screening of technology transfer;
4. Limitations on foreign managerial control; and
5. Ceilings on fees, royalties, and profits, as well as limitations on
the repatriation of profits.
South American legislation also pays homage to Calvoll in its requirement that investment disputes be adjudicated locally. Latin
American countries typically have been unreceptive to international
conventions which require third-party adjudication of disputes and
also to any kind of intervention by states representing aggrieved

investors. 58

57. The Calvo Doctrine, named after the 19th Century Argentine diplomat and
lawyer, is comprised of two major themes. The first is that other nations must abstain
from interference in what may be regarded as the sovereign and exclusive right of a
host state to control conduct within its borders and to determine the compensation for
its public takings. The second theme is that foreigners are subject to the laws and
regulations in the states in which they are found or in which they invest. Rogers, Of
Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the
Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1978).
To the extent that a Calvo Clause requires exhaustion of local remedies before a
claim may arise under international law, or before diplomatic intervention may take
place, the clause is but a codification of existing principles of international law. W.
FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN, & R. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 835-39 (1969). The clause may also validly prevent parties from utilizing a choiceof-forum clause. A legislative embodiment of the Calvo principle would nullify the effect of the forum clause since any judgment rendered pursuant thereto would not be
recognized.
To the extent, however, that a Calvo Clause may be worded so as to deny the
jurisdiction of another state over a specific area of law, the clause may itself violate international law. Under traditional bases of jurisdiction, a state may prescribe and enforce its own rules of law if the conduct involved has a significant effect upon the territory of that state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 8, 10, 18 (1965). If two states are affected by actions, both may
have jurisdiction. Hence, any attempt by one state to oust the jurisdiction of the other
is a violation of international law, as an impingement upon sovereignty. Of course, no
state is required to enforce the laws or judgments of another state. Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895). If the judgment of a state having jurisdiction over an area
of law contravened the public policy of the second state, the second state need not enforce or recognize the judgment. Id. this does not justify the second state, however, in
attempting to dictate the jurisdiction of the first state. See British Nylon Spinners v.
Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 119551 1 Ch. 37 (extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction
in derogation of the sovereignty of a sister state is improper). But see CERDS, supra
note 40.
Neither may a Calvo Clause operate to deprive a state of its right to vindicate violations of international law committed against its nationals. North American Dredging
Co. Case (United States v. Mexico) 4 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 26 (1951). The right
of a nation to vindicate violations of international law perpetrated against its nationals
is a right appertaining to sovereignty. It is, therefore, not waivable by a private party.
58. See Szasz, The Investments Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA.
(1970-1971).
J. INT'L L.
Published
by256
eCommons,
1980

116

UNIVERSITY OFDAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

Recent Mexican enactments, similar in nature to the codes urged
by South America countries, have provoked widespread comment.5 9
These controversial Mexican enactments will be examined as a prototype of LDC investment and technology legislation.
A.

Mexican Investment Legislation

Aimed at a balanced and independent development, Mexico's Law
6
to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment
was enacted on May 9, 1973. Enacted to encourage investment in those
areas where Mexican owned business did not extend, the law was
designed to increase industrial growth and development of Mexican industry without cutting off the flow of much needed foreign capital and
technology. 6 ' There is much discussion whether Mexico has, in fact,
achieved her goals. 62
The Mexican law provides that foreigners may generally not control more than forty-nine percent of the capital of Mexican enterprises
not otherwise specifically regulated. 63 This prohibition, however, can
be waived; the National Commission on Foreign Investment may grant
exceptions when such an exception would, in its judgment, prove
beneficial to the Mexican economy.6 4 Participation of a foreign
investor in the management of a6 local corporation may not exceed the
investor's capital participation.
Article 2 of Mexico's Foreign Investment Law defines foreign
investors. Foreign investors include:
1. Foreign individuals or companies;
2. Mexican enterprises, the majority of whose capital is controlled by foreigners; 66 and
59. E.g., Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanization, and the New International
Economic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 289 (1977-1978);
Camp & Magnon, Recent Developments Under the Mexican Foreign Investment Law
and the Law Regulating the Transfer of Technology, 8 LAW. AMERICAS 1 (1976); Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled but Participatory Independence, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 1 (1973-1974).
60. [March 9, 1973], D.O.
61. Vizcaino, The Law on Foreign Investment, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 33
(1977).
62. E.g., Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanization, and the New International
Economic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 289 (1977-1978).
See also Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 270 (1978).
63. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment

[March 9, 1973] art. 5, D.O. [hereinafter cited as Investment Law].
64. Id. art. 5, 13; Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 34, 37.
65. Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 33-34.
66. Id. at 35; Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 2.
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3. Foreign economic units not retaining legal status (for example,
joint ventures).
Individuals who attain the status of permanent resident are not conwhich have
sidered foreign investors unless connected with enterprises
67
the capacity of making economic decisions abroad.
Articles 4 and 5 of the Foreign Investment Law delineate the
various sectors of the economy that are closed to foreign investors.
These sectors are those which deal with the following areas: 68
1. Petroleum and other hydrocarbons;
2. Basic petrochemicals;
3. Exploitation of radioactive minerals and the generation of
nuclear energy;
4. Mining;
5. Electricity;
6. Railroads;
7. Telegraphs and wireless communications; and
8. Other areas established in specific law.
Other activities reserved exclusively for Mexicans or Mexican companies with an exclusion of foreigners clause in their corporate by-laws
include: 69
1. Radio and television;
2. Urban and interurban automotive transportation and federal
highways transport;
3. Domestic air and maritime transportation;
4. Exploitation of forestry resources;
5. Gas distribution; and
6. Others established in specific laws or regulations issued by the
federal executive.
Similarly, article 5 lists those activities wherein foreign investment
is limited even below the general forty-nine percent capital control ceiling. These activities include the exploitation of certain national
reserves of mineral substances (thirty-four percent), secondary products of the petrochemical industry (forty percent), and automotive part
manufacture. 0 A permanent resident may not engage in those
activities reserved exclusively for Mexicans."'
In view of the obvious importance of the national defense sector to
any state, it is interesting to note that the Foreign Investment Law does
67.
68.

Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 35.
Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 4.

69.

Id.

70. Id. art. 5.
71. Id. art. 6; Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 35-36.
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not close the national defense, arms, and ammunitions sector to
foreigners."' Commerical banking is also not closed to foreigners and
certain aspects of the export business may even be available to
73
foreigners on an unusually liberal basis.
These limits and ceilings are not, however, absolutely rigid. The
National Commission for Foreign Investment has the authority to
make exceptions from the ceilings under certain circumstances. In
making such exceptions the National Commission must, by law, consider a multitude of factors and goals, which include:
1. The extent to which the foreign investment will complement
local investment;
2. The extent to which the foreign investment will or will not
displace Mexican industries which are operating satisfactorily;
3. The extent to which the investment will exist in activities adequately covered by Mexican enterprises;
4. The positive effect of the investment on the balance of payment, and particularly, on the increase in exports;
5. The effect of the foreign investment on employment, taking
into consideration the occupational level that it generates and the
wages paid;
6. The resulting employment and training of technicians and
administrative personnel of Mexican nationality;
7. The incorporation of national goods and components in the
manufacture of the resulting products;
8. The extent to which the resulting operation finances its
activities with resources from abroad;
9. The diversification of the investment sources and the necessity of promoting regional and sub-regional integration in the Latin
American area;
10. Contribution of the foreign investment to the development of
zones or areas of relatively lower economic development;
11. Guarantees of the investor not to take monopolistic positions
in the national market;
12. The capital structure of the economic activity;
13. The technological contribution and assistance in research and
development of the technology of the country by the resulting activity;
14. The resulting effect on price levels and the quality of production;
72. National Legislation, supra note 47, at 40. One might believe that LDC's
would be especially hesitant to allow foreigners access to the national defense sector,
considering investment laws from the perspective of nationalism.

73.

Id. See also Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 13. To the extent that a

foreign investor may be able to contribute to the Mexican export capacity, he will increase the state's receipts of foreign reserves.
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15. Preservation of the social and cultural values of the country;
16. The importance of the activity within the national economy;
17. The extent to which the foreign investor identifies with the interests of the country and his connection with centers of economic
decision abroad; and
18. In general, the extent to which the investment collaborates in
74
the achievement of goals and policies of national development.
Finally, in a bow to the Calvo Doctrine," the law provides that
foreign companies may acquire ownership of land and water, when
authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Relations, only if the individual
agrees to consider himself as a Mexican citizen with respect to the
property; 76 he may not invoke the protection of his native government
with respect to the investment." Noncompliance risks the penalty of
forfeiture of the properties so acquired. 78
B.

Mexican Transfer of Technology" Legislation

The Mexican Law on the Transfer of Technology" was designed to
achieve technological independence. Recognizing that some transfer of
technology from foreign licensors or investors is desirable, 8 ' Mexico
74. Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 13.
75. See note 57 supra.
76. Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 7; Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 39-40. This
is an expression of Mexican sovereignity and nationalism. The pressures of foreign exploitation have led to the inclusion of similar provisions in the Mexican Constitution.
MEXICAN CONST. art. 27, reprinted in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Mexico) 10 (1978).
77. MEXICAN CONST. art. 27, reprintedin 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Mexico) 10 (1978). See also Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 7, Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 39-40.
78. Vizcaino, supra note 61, at 39-40; Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 7.
79. Transfer of technology is characterized as the transfer of know-how, skills,
methods, processes, and information. The transfer may be accomplished through
working, learning, experience, licensing, or export of goods. See Guidelines, supra
note 4, at 5.
80. Law for the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks [Dec. 30, 1972], D.O. [hereinafter cited as
Technology Law].
81. Soberanis, Legal Aspects Concerning the Technology Transfer Process in
Mexico, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 17, 18 (1977). As previously noted, United States
economic growth during the first half of the 20th century was due mainly to
technological innovation. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. The acquisition of
technology, therefore, is crucial, but is helpful only when the technology is acquired on
even terms. MNC's and other investors, however, have, in the past, often utilized
superior bargaining position and experience to fetter the beneficial acquisition of
technology. See Hyde & de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of Technology and
Foreign Investment Laws-To What Extent Have the Rules Changed?, 10 INT'L LAW.
231, 233 (1976).
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has attempted to strengthen the bargaining position of local purchasers
and to acquire the best possible technology under the best of circumstances. 8 " In so doing, Mexico has required that agreements contemplating a transfer of technology must be registered;8" failure to do
so will render the agreement unenforceable."' The types of agreements
which must be registered are delineated in article 2 of the Law on the
Transfer of Technology. 5 An agreement having effect in Mexico and
which contemplates a transfer of technology of almost any type, must
be registered." Oral agreements are apparently covered under the
87
regulation and must eventually be reduced to writing.
While the law is widespread in coverage, the obligation to register
an agreement falls upon residents and corporations or persons of Mexican nationality.88 The foreigner who does not reside in Mexico is not
obligated to register an agreement; 9 the failure to do so, however, will
render the agreement unenforceable. 98 Agreements solely between
Mexican nationals are not excluded from the scope of the technology
law. 9 ' Mexico has attempted to tailor its law to the requirements of international law in excluding nonresident aliens from an obligation to
register. 9
Agreements must be registered within sixty days after they have
been entered into; amendments and modifications must also be
registered. 93
In order to provide for the harmonious development of the Mexican economy and at the same time absorb only appropriate
technology, article 7 of the Mexican technology law provides a number
of circumstances which, when found to exist, will lead to the denial of
82. Soberanis, supra note 81, at 18.
83. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 2; Brill, Transfers of Technology in
Mexico, 4 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 51, 53 (1974); Soberanis, supra note 81, at 19.
84. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 6; Brill, Transfers of Technology in
Mexico, 4 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 51, 54 (1974).
85. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 2.
86. Id.; Soberanis, supra note 81, at 19. But see Brill, supra note 83, at 53. Brill
interprets the Mexican law as requiring registration only if the technology agreement
will result in any act being carried out in Mexican territory.
87. Soberanis, supra note 81, at 20.
88. Id. at 28; Technology Law, supra note 80, arts. 3, 6; Brill, supra note 83, at
54.
89. Technology Law, supra note 80, arts. 3, 6.
90. Id. art. 6.
91. Soberanis, supra note 81, at 20.
92. Id. See generally Akehurst, Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, in [1972-1973]
46 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 189. Such an obligation would have extraterritorial effect. Extraterritoriality is suspect, though not always forbidden, under international law. Id.
93. Soberanis, supra note 81, at 20; Brill, supra note 83, at 54; Technology Law,
supra note 80, art. 4.
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registration of a licensing agreement. 9 ' The obstacles to registration
consist mainly of anticompetitive practices which are engaged in
typically by MNC's.1 Some of the impediments are waivable while
others are not. 96 Provisions forbidding tie-in clauses,9" for example,
can be waived under certain circumstances as can be the provisions
relating to foreign management and decisionmaking. 98 Provisions
which can not be waived are those which forbid contracts for the
transfer of that technology which is freely available in the country, and
those which prohibit contracts containing grantback clauses. 99 It
should be noted in passing, however, that this grantback restriction is
mild in form.' 0
The Mexican Transfer of Technology Law provides that
agreements which contain certain other types of clauses may also not
be registered. Such clauses are those requiring that differences of interpretation or questions of compliance with the agreement be submitted
94.

Agreements providing for the following are not registerable:
1. Transfer of technology freely available in Mexico;
2. Excessive price or consideration which is unduly burdensome on the
economy;
3. Permission for the supplier to regulate the administration of the
transferee of the technology;
4. Grantbacks of patents, trademarks, innovations, or improvements;
5. Limitations upon research or development;
6. Tie-ins;
7. Prohibition of export of licensee's goods or services against the best interests of Mexico;
8. Prohibition of the use of complementary technology;
9. Obligation to sell the products manufactured by the licensee only to the
licensor;
10. Permanent use of personnel designated by the licensor;
11. Limitation on production of the licensee or imposition of prices by the
licensor; and
12. Unreasonable term of duration of the licensing agreement.
Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 4.
95.

Jeffries, Regulation of Transfer of Technology: An Evaluation of the UNC-

TAD Code of Conduct, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 309, 312, 314-15 (1977).
96. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 8; Soberanis, supra note 81, at 22-28.
97. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 8; Soberanis, supra note 81, at 24. A tiein clause is a clause requiring the purchaser to purchase raw materials, spare parts, or
imports, as well as the desired technology. Acquisition of the technology is conditional
upon agreement to purchase the tied-in materials.
98. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 8; Soberanis, supra note 81, at 24.
99. A grantback clause is a clause usually requiring the licensee to grant back to
the licensor ownership and knowledge of improvements on the technology without
payment.
100. There appears to be no prohibition against obligating the licensee to license
back to the licensor any improvements developed by the licensee. Brill, supra note 83,
at 56.
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for resolution to foreign judicial tribunals.' Apparently, however, a
provision providing for dispute settlement by a foreign arbitral
tribunal is not forbidden.' 0 2 Mexican law, however, must apply.', 3
As with many regulatory and administrative schemes found within
the United States,' 0° decisions regarding the rejection of a licensing
agreement are subject to appeal. In the first instance, a disappointed
entrepreneur has the right to a "reconsideration."' ' 01 Once a request
for reconsideration has been made, and the applicant has- submitted his
proof, the National Registry for the Transfer of Technology must
decide the appeal within forty-five days. Failure to decide the appeal
within that time will result in the appeal being deemed favorable to the
applicant as a matter of law.'10 Should a foreign investor remain unsatisfied, further recourse is available in a federal district court and
finally in the Tribunal Colegiado Circuito en Materia
Administrativa.,0 7
C. Mexican Industrial Property Legislation
The new Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks,' 8 as well as
the law concerning the transfer of technology, introduce a number of
innovations and additions into Mexican law. Some of the more significant features involve duration and forfeiture of industrial property
rights.
The duration of industrial property rights has been truncated by
the Mexican legislation.' 0 9 The Mexican law has also introduced the
licensing into the Mexican system of industrial
concept of compulsory
property rights." ' Such a concept is no stranger to the western
world."' Industrial property rights must be worked; a failure to so
101. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 7; Brill, supra note 83, at 58; Soberanis,
supra note 81, at 27.
102. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 7; Soberanis, supra note 81, at 27.
103. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 7; Brill, supra note 83, at 58.
104. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
105. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 14; Brill, supra note 83, at 60; Soberanis,
supra note 81, at 29-30.
106. Technology Law, supra note 80, art. 14; Brill, supranote 83, at 60; Soberanis,
supra note 81, at 29-30.
107. Soberanis, supra note 81, at 31.
108. Law on Inventions and Trademarks [Feb. 10, 1976], D.O. [hereinafter cited
as Invention and Trademark Law].
109. Medina, Significant Innovations of the New Mexican Law on Inventions and
Trademarks, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 11 (1977).
110. Id. at 10; Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 50.
111. See National Approaches, supra note 2, at 100-01. See also Henry, MultiNational Practice in Determining Provisions in Compulsory Patent Licenses, 11 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 325 (1976-1977); Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the
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work these rights may entail substantial penalties. 1 2
Like some South American countries, notably the Andean
group,' 3 Mexican law provides that certain types of products and
processes may not be patented. Inventions relating to health, nutrition,
agricultural protection, nuclear energy, national security, and defense
of the atmosphere fall within this category."" Inventions relating to
these fields, however, may be protected by a certificate of invention.
The term of registration of such an invention is limited to ten years; 15
the invention must be new, it must be the product of inventive activity,
and most importantly to a country in Mexico's position, it must be
susceptible of being applied industrially." 6 Rights and obligations
accrue to the inventor upon registration.'
Pursuant to the new law and consistent with the recommendations
United States: A Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 404 (1975). While the
United States does not have a comprehensive statutory scheme of compulsory licensing, case law has established the propriety of compulsory licensing as a remedy for antitrust abuses. Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United
States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953). In some instances, the
judiciary has, in effect, sanctioned compulsory licensing not as a remedy for antitrust
violations, but merely in the public interest. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934). Certain statutes also provide implicitly or explicitly for compulsory licensing in the public interest, under limited circumstances.
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976). For further developments, see Note, Is a Compulsory
PatentLicensing Statute Necessary?A Study of the U.S. and ForeignExperience, 7 L.
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1207 (1975). See also Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co.,
492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).

112. Failure to properly work industrial property rights will result in compulsory
licensing of the property and, in the long run, may result in forfeiture. Invention and
Trademark Law, supra note 108, arts. 50, 57; Medina, supra note 109, at 10, 11.
113. For example, pharmaceuticals are not patentable in many South American
countries such as Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. The Role of the
Patent System, supra note 2, at 53.
114. Medina, supra note 109, at 6.
115. Id. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, arts. 34, 66, 67.
116. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 65. It should be noted
that the substantive requirements for obtaining a certificate of invention are the same
as those required for obtaining a patent. Medina, supra note 109, at 6.
117. Rights accruing to the holder of the certificate are fourfold. First, the owner
may exploit the subject invention himself. Second, the owner may receive a royalty for
exploitation of the invention by a third party. Third, the owner may sue for damages
upon infringement arising from the manufacture of subject products. Finally, the
owners retains some control over the conditions of the exploitation license which may
be granted third parties. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, arts. 67, 68,
71, 77, 214; Medina, supra note 109, at 6-7.
Obligations incurred by the owner include the duty to register any agreement
whereby he may authorize an interested party to exploit the subject invention. He must
also furnish that information which may be necessary to exploit the invention. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, arts. 67, 71, 77, 78, 211, 214; Medina, supra

note 109, at 7.
Published by eCommons, 1980

124

UNIVERSITY OFDAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

of international organizations such as UNIDO,"' Mexico's law provides that patents must be worked or exploited.' 9 Measured from the
date the patent is issued, the inventor must begin working the patent
within three years. Failure to so work the patent or failure to work the
patent sufficiently shall be grounds for the grant of a compulsory
license. 0 An application for a compulsory license is to be evaluated by
the Head Bureau of Inventions and Trademarks.' 2 ' While the
obligatory license is not exclusive, and may not be sub-licensed without
the authorization and consent of the owner of the patent,' 2 2 the license
may be transferred with the authorization of the Department of
23
Industry and Commerce.
Protection for trademarks has also been reduced, consistent with
Mexico's policy of national economic autonomy and increased competition in industry.'2I Trademarks may be registered only for five year
periods and may be renewed for five year periods.' 25 Previous Mexican
law had provided for ten year periods of protection.' 2 6 It should be
observed that a trademark registration may be refused renewal where
the owner thereof has not demonstrated that the trademark has been
sufficiently used. 21 When there is no renewal, the trademark reverts to
the public domain. *2
One peculiar characteristic of the Mexican Law on Inventions and
Trademarks is that dual trademarks may sometimes be required.' 2 9
118. This is an acronym for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
Without exploitation of inventions, the host country does not obtain the benefit of
the invention, nor the know-how necessary to eventually exploit it.
119. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 41; Medina, supra note
109, at 9-10. See generally The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2.
120. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 41; Medina, supra note
109, at 9. A compulsory license is a government mandated license of intellectual property rights from the owner to a licensee.
121. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 52; Medina, supra note
109, at 10.
122. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 55; Medina, supra note
109, at 10.
123. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 55; Medina, supra note
109, at 10.
124. As is discussed in note 134 infra, the international system of trademark protection has been attacked as conducive to foreign exploitation.
125. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 112; Medina, supra note
109, at 11.
126. Law on Industrial Property [Dec. 31, 1942], D.O.
127. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 140.
128. Id.
129. The use of dual trademarks, or linking, is apparently designed to remedy certain licensor abuses. For example, a Mexican distributor or licensee who has enhanced
the reputation of a trademark, and has increased sales, often finds that the foreign
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When a trademark has originally been registered abroad and is subsequently registered in Mexico, it must be used in conjunction with a
trademark registered in Mexico that has not been previously registered
in another country. 3 0 This provision of Mexican law is of dubious
validity under international law in view of Mexico's membership in the
Paris Union.' 3
As in the case of patents, compulsory licensing of trademarks may,
3
in some circumstances, be required by the national authorities.' This
action may be taken to avoid "the abuse or inconveniences for the
economy of the country, which could derive from the exclusive use of
the trademark." 1 3 3 A trademark may be cancelled when it is used to

exploit the national economy, gain undue control thereof, or when
improper use is made of the quality of the product or the service
covered by the trademark.' 3 The Andean3 Common Market has provided similar restrictions in its decisions. 1
licensor removes the trademark license. The use of a dual trademark would allow the
licensee to profit from his efforts by enabling him to retain at least part of the symbol
of quality.
The use of dual trademarks, however, is a clumsy means of protection. The dual
trademark imposes tremendous expenditures upon the Mexican licensee. He would be
required to change advertising, containers, and cartons to conform to the law. Exported products would confuse foreign consumers who may be used to seeing wellknown trademarks. See generally Delgado, Technology Transfer and Trademark Problems in Mexico, 9 PAT. L. REV. 43 (1977).
130. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, arts. 127, 128; Medina, supra
note 109, at 13.
131. See notes 153-56 and accompanying text infra.
132. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 132; Medina, supra note
109, at 14. For United States practice, see Dobb, Compulsory Trademark Licensure as
a Remedy for Monopolization, 10 INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. REv. 193 (1978).
133.' Medina, supra note 109, at 14 (quoting from Invention and Trademark Law,
supra note 108, preamble).
134. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 150, para. 2. It is
arguable that trademarks aid in the perpetuation of monopoly abuses, deceptive advertising, and diluted product quality, if improperly used. The monopoly aspect of
trademarks is especially important to Mexico and other LDC's. See generally Dobb,
supra note 132, at 193; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Secretariat, the Impact of Trademarks on the Development Process of Developing
, 1977); United Nations Conference on
Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/3 (
Trade and Development, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Role
of the Industrial Property System in the Transfer of Technology, Annex IV, at 10-14,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/4/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD
Report, Annex IV]. For contrary viewpoints on the role of trademarks in economic
abuse, see McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty? 67
TRADEMARK REP. 197 (1977); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Role of the Industrial Property
System in the Transfer of Technology 4-6, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/4 (Oct. 26,
1977) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Report].
135. For a comparison of the Mexican laws with the laws of other nations, see National Legislation, supra note 47.

Published by eCommons, 1980

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

126

[Vol. 5:1

The Mexican laws that have been examined, as well as similar laws
of other LDC's, have been enacted to promote development, growth,
and prestige. Certainly LDC's have accomplished the latter. Their collective voice is respected in international circles and in such organizations as the United Nations. In many instances, however, these laws
cannot be completely reconciled with traditional concepts of international law.
THE MEXICAN LEGISLATION AND TRADITIONAL AND EVOLVING
CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

IV.

A.

Possible Violations of InternationalLaw

Mexico is a signatory of two international conventions designed to
protect the rights of foreign investors and commercial dealers. The
first multilateral agreement is the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.' 3 6 The second is the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.' 37 Some provisions of Mexican law relating to the transfer of technology potentially
violate the New York Convention. The New York Convention provides that:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of
a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term 'agreement in writing' shall include an arbitral clause
in a contract

....

138

Licensing agreements which must be registered with the National
Registry for the Transfer of Technology plainly fall within the contemplation of the New York Convention, if the agreements contain
arbitral clauses. Such arbitral clauses are commonplace in commercial
transactions.'"3 While Mexican law recognizes the decisions that may
be made by a foreign arbitral commission, Mexico will not recognize
any arbitral agreement or award when the substantive law applied by
the arbitral panel was, or shall be, a law other than that of Mexico. An
agreement containing a requirement to utilize foreign law will be considered invalid and, hence, the arbitral clause will be considered invalid
136.
137.
138.
139.

New York Convention, supra note 17.
Paris Convention, supra note 16.
New York Convention, supra note 17.
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See also McClelland,

InternationalArbitration: A PracticalGuide to the System for Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 729 (1976-1977).
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as will be any arbitral award stemming therefrom.I"I Article V of the
New York Convention, however, recognizes that choice of law provisions embodied in an arbitral clause are protected by the Convention.
Article V states, in pertinent part:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at
the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement
is sought, proof that:
(a).

The parties to the agreement . . . were, under the law

applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
1
country where the award was made ....

An agreement specifying as the governing law a law other than that of
Law;' 4 1
Mexico is invalid under the Mexican Transfer of Technology
hence, specific performance of such an arbitral agreement will not be
granted, and enforcement of any arbitral award stemming therefrom
will not be granted by Mexican tribunals.' 4 3 While there are embodied
within the Convention a number of exceptions to the requirement to
recognize and enforce foreign rrbitral agreements and awards, these
44
A blanket
exceptions have generally been narrowly construed.'
140. Technology Law, supra note180, art. 7, para. 14; Brill, supra note 83, at 58.
S141. New York Convention, supra note 17, art. V (emphasis added).
142. Technology Law, supra note 80, arts. 6, 7; Brill, supra note 83, at 54, 58.
143. Since the agreement would be unenforceable, Mexico would undoubtedly
regard clauses within the agreement as unenforceable.
144. Almost without exception, the cases dealing with the New York Convention
have evinced a pro-enforcement bias. The cases narrowly interpret the exceptions to
enforcement embodied within the Convention. E.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie due Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1974); Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976); Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Sidermar
S.p.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974); Trooboff & Goldstein, Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1958 New
York Convention: Experience to Date in the U.S. Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 469
(1976-1977).
Parsons & Whittemore must be regarded as the leading United States case on the
New York Convention. In Parsons& Whittemore, an arbitral tribunal sitting under the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce awarded RAKTA $312,507.45 for
breach of a construction contract. The matter had come before the arbitral tribunal
pursuant to an arbitration agreement embodied within the contract. Parsons and Whittemore had ceased work on the contruction project and had failed to continue work on
the project following the Egyptian-Israeli Six Day War. Parsons and Whittemore
sought a declaratory judgment preventing collection of the arbitral award; it alleged
five grounds on appeal in justification of nonrecognition, four of which were defenses
derived from the express language of the New York Convention. The Parsons& Whittemore court rejected the public policy defense on the ground that the defense was to
be narrowly construed; as such, it did not apply to the instant fact situation. The court
Published by eCommons, 1980
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restriction preventing enforcement of an agreement or award which
includes a bar even on the application of foreign law to a dispute involving only interpretation of the agreement would be overbroad, and
would therefore, not be sanctioned by the exceptions to the New York
Convention.""
intepreted the public policy defense as precluding enforcement of an arbitral award
"only when enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice." 508 F.2d at 974. The fact that there had been a severance of AmericanEgyptian relations was, therefore, insufficient to invoke the public policy defense successfully. The other defenses were also narrowly construed in conformance with the
pro-enforcement thrust of the Convention. Article V, paragraph 2 of the Convention
authorized nonrecognition of an award where the subject matter of the underlying
dispute was incapable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the forum state.
The Second Circuit held that this defense was confined to those situations where certain categories of claims would be nonarbitrable because of the special national interest
vested in their resolution. Id. at 975. To uphold this defense merely because certain
issues of national interest incidentally figure into the resolution of the dispute "would
vitiate the Convention's basic effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement."
Id. at 973.
It should be pointed out, however, that there is some authority, including the
travaux prepetoires, or legislative history of the Convention, which suggests that a
broad interpretation of the exceptions (particularly the public policy exception) is appropriate. See United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,
Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting 14, 15, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR. 17
(Sept. 12, 1958); INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION III.C.149 (G. Gaja ed.

1978); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049,
1071 (1960-1961). See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 530-31 n.10
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

The more persuasive argument, however, is that the exceptions to enforcement

should be narrowly construed. Prior to the advent of the New York Convention, two

multilateral conventions governed international enforcement of arbitration. These
agreements were the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done Sept. 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 157 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral

Awards, done Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301. These conventions were ineffective
because the exceptions to recognition and enforcement were too easily used by
recalcitrant defendants. The exceptions were broadly interpreted and nonexclusive; the
burden was placed upon the party seeking enforcement. Contini, InternationalCommercial Arbitration:The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 289 (1959); Quigley, supra,
at 1054-55. The New York Convention was designed to change the thrust of enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards. Since the New York Convention is designed,
quite obviously, to provide a broad base of enforcement of international arbitral
agreements, id. at 1060, and since arbitration is a cornerstone of international commercial transactions, see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the exceptions should be narrowly construed. Speculation concerning language that was not included should not be permitted to contravene the purpose of the Convention.
Parochial interests should not be elevated above commercial stability and international
comity.
145. It is difficult to perceive how a blanket restriction on enforceability of arbitral
awards resulting from interpretation of agreements would violate Mexico's most basic
notions of morality or public policy. It is also difficult to accept the notion that interpretation of a licensing agreement would be a matter incapable of settlement by arbitration.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/7
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Some of the provisions of Mexico's Law on Inventions and
Trademarks also appear to violate a number of provisions of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.'" 6 Under Mexico's law, compulsory licensing may be granted if the patentee has not
sufficiently worked the patent three years from the time the patent was
issued.' 7 The Paris Convention, however, states:
An application for a compulsory license may not be made on the
ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration
of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application

or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period
last expires .

. . .'

Mexican law allows no justification for the failure to work a
patent.' 9 Article 5 of the Paris Convention, however, further provides
that a compulsory license "shall be refused if the patentee justifies his
inaction by legitimate reasons.""' A further infringement of the Paris
Convention is contained in those provisions of the invention and
trademark law which allow the government to transfer a compulsory
license.' 51 On this point, article 5(A), paragraph 4 of the Paris Convention states that "a compulsory license . . . shall not be transferable,
even in the form of a grant of a sub-license, except with that part of
the enterprise or goodwill using such license."' 5 2
Provisions of article 6 of the Paris Convention are also potentially
violated by certain aspects of the Mexican trademark law. Pertinent
provisions of Mexican law require that foreign originated trademarks
be registered and displayed together with local originated
trademarks. " Article 6 quinquies of the Convention mandates,
146. Mexico is not bound by the latest version of the Paris Convention, not having
acceded to the Stockholm revision. Instead, Mexico is bound by the Lisbon version of
the Paris Convention which is not significantly different from the present version in
regard to the matters which will be discussed. See I S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND RELATED RIGHTS

70 (1975). The Lisbon version is cited as the Paris Convention

for the Protection of Industrial Property, revised at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention, Lisbon version]. The
French text has been translated into English and use will be made of the English
translation. The translation is found in III LADAS, supra, at 1911.
147. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
148. Paris Convention, Lisbon version, supra note 146, art. 5(A), para. 4 (emphasis added).
149. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 50.
150. Paris Convention, Lisbon version, supra note 146, art. 5(A), para. 4.
151. Invention and Trademark Law, supra note 108, art. 55; Medina, supra note
109, at 10.
152. Paris Convention, Lisbon version, supra note 146, art. 5(A), para. 4 (emphasis added).
153. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
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however, that "[e]very trademark duly registered in the country of
origin shall be accepted for filing and protected in its originalform in
the other countries of the Union, subject to the reservations indicated
in the present Article."" Such reservations encompass situations
wherein the trademark infringes upon the rights of others or where the
trademark is devoid of distinctive character. Trademarks may also be
denied registration where the trademark is deceptive, contrary to
morality, or inimical to public order.'I 5 A trademark is not contrary to
public order merely because the trademark is incompatible with a provision of local law on marks.' 6
B.

Possible Justifications

It is standard treaty law that agreements to which nations are
signatories must be honored. Expressed via the axiom of pacta sunt
servanda,"7 this requirement is one of the most ancient and timehonored rules of international law.'
There exist, however, certain
countervailing norms, which, when present, render written agreements
nonbinding. Two norms, in particular, are pertinent to Mexico and to
developing states. These norms are known as rebus sic stantibus'" and
jus cogens. I"
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, first implied in treaties and
contracts, developed into an independent ground for termination of
treaties.' 6 ' Rebus sic stantibus is an embodiment of the principle that
certain types of changes in circumstances will provide a ground for ter154. Paris Convention, Lisbon version, supra note 146, art. 6 quinquies(A) (emphasis added).
155. Id. art. 6 quinquies(B).
156. Id.
157. Pactasunt servandameans that operative written agreements must be adhered
to. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (5th ed. 1979); Kunz, The Meaning and the
Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180 (1945). Essentially,
treaties entered into by following proper treaty procedure are valid and binding upon
the parties unless norm abolishing facts, as laid down by international law, are proven.
The superior normative nature of pactasunt servanda requires that written agreements
be honored unless there is a clear showing of the norm abolishing facts. Id. at 181, 190,
197.
158. Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM.
J. INT'L L. 180 (1945). See also T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 40 (1974).
159. Rebus sic stantibus is otherwise known as the doctrine of changed circumstances.
160. A jus cogens is a hierarchically superior norm with which subsidiary norms
must comply. It may be considered part of the superstructure of international law.
161. Depending upon one's view, it is possible to ascribe the general existence of
rebus sic stantibusto either Roman law or Canon law. In any event, writers had seized
upon the concept by the sixteenth century. Toth, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus
in InternationalLaw, 1974 JUR. REV. 56, 60, 61.
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mination of a treaty obligation. The principle is not unlike the wellknown domestic principle that a frustration of purpose will operate to
excuse failures of contractual performance or terminate the

contract.' 62 Having its roots in Roman law,' 63 rebus sic stantibus has
progressed through various stages of development. First accepted as an
implied clause by learned scholars,"6 then accepted as a general principle of law," 5 the principle has changed substantially and may now be
considered to be a rule of customary international law.'66 The principle
has been invoked numerous times in the twentieth century as a ground

for termination or modification of a treaty" 7 and has not been de-

nounced as contrary to accepted norms of international law." 68 While
is substanthe exact limits of the doctrine are not clearly defined, there
9
tial guidance available from the Vienna Convention. "6
The result of efforts extending over the period of twenty years, the
Vienna Convention codifies, with substantial precision, the limits of
162. The Uniform Commercial Code embodies such a principle. U.C.C. § 2-615(a)
reads:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greter obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for
sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable
foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later
proves to be invalid.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Toth, supra note 161, at 79.
163. The essence of the doctrine, however, was crystallized by commentators and
canonists. Toth, supra note 161, at 59, 60.
164. Id. at 58.
165. Id. at 79.
166. There are several sources of international law. Customary law is comprised of
the practice of nations. Such practice, in order to constitute customary international
law, must be constant and uniform. It must also be accompanied by the conviction
that the action is the exercise of a right or fulfillment of an obligation guaranteed or required by law. Finally, there must be a general acquiescence in, or recognition of, the
practice by the international community. Toth, supra note 161, at 148.
Treaties are a second source of law. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(l)(a). A third source of
law is general principles of law recognized by civilzed nations. Id. art. 38(1)(c). General
principles may produce only subsidiary rules of law. See generally Kunz, supra note
157, at 180. Case law, opinions of scholars, and writings of jurists constitute the fourth
source of international law. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(l)(d).
167. See, e.g., The Diversion of the Water from the Meuse, [1937], P.C.I.J. Ser.
A/B, No. 70; Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland and Federal

Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [19731 I.C.J.

-,

reprinted in 12

INT'L LEGAL

290 (1973); Case Concerning the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory
(Merits) (Portugal v. India), [1960] I.C.J. 6, 25-29.
168. Toth, supra note 161, at 153.
169. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
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the doctrine. As a result partly of the efforts of the drafters of the
Vienna Convention, rebus sic stantibusis now an objective principle of
customary international law.'7 0
In order for rebus sic stantibusto apply five conditions must obtain:
1. The change in circumstances must relate to conditions existing
at the time of the conclusion of the treaty;
2. The change must be fundamental;
3. The change must be one unforeseen by the parties;
4. The existence of the original circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by
the treaty; and
5. The change in circumstances must have radically transformed
the scope of obligations remaining to be performed under the treaty."
The International Court of Justice' has further refined the definition of fundamental changes as referring to those changes which
imperil the existence or vital development of one of the parties." 3 The
World Court also emphasized that the two major features or requirements of rebus sic stantibus are the existence of a fundamental
170. Toth, supra note 161, at 170. See also Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408
(1887); Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland and Federal Republic

of Germany v. Iceland), [19731 I.C.J.

__,

reprinted in 12
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(1973).
171. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 62.
172. The International Court of Justice, an arm of the United Nations, is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Permanent Court of International Justice existed under the auspices of the League of Nations. The authority of
the International Court of Justice derives from the U.N. Charter and the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
U.N. CHARTER art. 92 establishes the International Court of Justice. All members of
the U.N. are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and may avail
themselves of the services of that Court. Id. art. 93. Pursuant to rules which may be
promulgated by the Security Council, the Court may also hear cases of states not party
to the United Nations Charter. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 35. Only states may appear as
parties before the Court; organizations and individuals may not. Id. art. 34.
Unlike the United States federal judiciary, the International Court of Justice may
render advisory opinions. Id. art. 65; U.N. CHARTER art. 96. Both the General
Assembly and the Security Council may request advisory opinions; other organs may
request advisory opinions when authorized by the General Assembly. U.N. CHARTER
art. 96. The Court consists of fifteen judges of different nationalities. I.C.J. STAT. art.
3. In submitting their causes to the Court, parties undertake to abide by its judgment.
Should one party fail to abide by the judgment, the other party may have recourse to
the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
Jurisdiction of the Court is defined by I.C.J. STAT. art. 36. Parties may agree in advance to the jurisdiction of the Court or may, when a dispute arises, specially consent
to its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Court is purely voluntary. The Court may
utilize in its decisions treaties, case law, customary law, teachings and writings, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Id. arts. 36, 38.
The International Court of Justice is sometimes referred to as the World Court.
173. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 62.
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change of circumstances and a radical transformation of the scope of
the reqirements imposed by the treaty.""4
Mexico or other LDC's might put forth the following type of argument to justify any alleged violations of treaty obligations by virtue of
its technology or investment laws. First, the sudden and rapid rise in
foreign investment in LDC's and the rapid growth of MNC's provide a
change of circumstances; the abuse control mechanisms of the Paris
Convention might well be insufficient presently to deal with monopoly
abuses."' The competitiveness of national economies is threatened by
the improper use of patent rights to restrict imports.' 76 Research and
development activities occur mainly within developed countries; when
patents expire, therefore, patented knowledge does not revert to the
public domain of a LDC. An arguably essential basis of consent by
LDC's was the ability to control abusive or damaging practices
through the safety mechanisms of the Convention.'" This arguably no
longer exists.
Secondly, the change in circumstances was difficult to foresee as
the parties to the Paris Convention could have had no idea of the
tremendous growth in foreign investment and proliferation of MNC's
that has occurred. It is to be noted that the proliferation of MNC's
and the concomitant rapid rise in foreign investment in LDC's is
174.

Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, [1973] I.C.J., at __ , reprinted in 12 INT'L
290, 298, 307.
The Vienna Convention expresses a preference that the mechanism of rebus sic stantibus not be unilaterally invoked. Article 65 of the Convention requires notice be provided affected parties and articles 65 and 66 provide that amicable negotiations must
first be attempted. Failing agreement by negotiation, judicial or arbitral proceedings
should be utilized. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 66. Commentators also
agree that certain procedures must be followed before rebus sic stantibus may take effect. Toth, supra note 161, at 169.
175. See notes 286-98 and accompanying text infra.
176. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat, The International Patent System: The Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection on
Industrial Property 18, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2 (June 28, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention]. See also notes 286-98 and accompanying text infra.
177. The inclusion of safety mechanisms in articles 4 and 5 of the Convention is, in
itself, evidence of the necessity to control abusive practices since the thrust of the Convention is not to protect the patent granting state, but the patentee. See also I S.
LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS 59-94 (1975).
Alternatively, an undertaking of obligations to protect intellectual property may be
said to be based upon the understanding that competition and development would be
fostered, not that restrictive business practices would be protected. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is indeed the justification for the industial property system. See
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the Group of
Governmental Experts on the Role of the Industrial Property System in the Transfer of
Technology, Annex V, 3, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/4/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Report, Annex V1.
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basically, though not exclusively, a post-World War II phenomenon.''
The Vienna Convention requires only an inquiry into that which was
foreseen, not that which was foreseeable; as such the test of the Vienna
Convention is much narrower than any foreseeability test.' 79 It is difficult to believe that the rapid growth of foreign investment and
MNC's was actually forseen by many of the parties.
The only remaining question is whether the change is fundamental,
i.e., whether the change in global economic relations imperils vital
development of LDC's and, in particular, Mexico. Such an inquiry is
not easily undertaken and may persuasively be answered in either the
affirmative or the negative. It may be argued that there is, in fact, no
imperilment of vital development. The argument may well be made
that what has occurred is not an imperilment of vital development, but
a change in political perspective and outlook." 80 Indeed LDC's,
including Mexico, have experienced high growth rates, particularly
during the late sixties. The gross domestic product of Mexico and certain other LDC's"' has achieved growth rates in excess of 5 percent
per annum." 21 On the other hand, it may persuasively be argued that
these growth rates are the rates of the highest achievers; even in these
countries there is a steady and high rate of annual population growth,
thus reducing the expected growth in per capita income
considerably." 3 Furthermore, the argument might be advanced that
these growth rates cannot be expected to continue;" ' the widening gap
in per capita income between LDC's and developed countries, while
not necessarily dangerous in itself, may well contribute to political and
social unrest and resentment." 5 Much of this resentment may be
engendered by the dominant economic position of MNC's, and their
perceived excesses." ' Whether through direct or indirect means, the
178. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 5-6 (1974); R. TINDALL,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 9-10 (1975).

179. Those familiar with tort law can appreciate the potentially pervasive nature of
a test based upon foreseeability. Almost anything is foreseeable; very little is actual
foreseen.
180. See C. KINDLEBERGER & B. HERRICK, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 316 (1977);
M. MERHAV, TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE, MONOPOLY, AND GROWTH 18 (1969).
181. H. MYINT, THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10 (4th ed. 1973).

These countries include Brazil, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Signapore, South Korea,
Thailand, and Iraq. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184.

Id. at 12.

185.

Id. at 15, 16. Rising expectations and envy may cause political resentment.

186. As previously noted, MNC's are often accused of committing restrictive
business practices and of overreaching. See note 19 supra.
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growth of MNC's imperils vital development.' 7 If one accepts the
argument that there has been no vital change in circumstances, there is
no justification for termination of the Paris Convention; hence those
LDC's which are parties to the Paris Convention and which have
enacted restrictive technology, investment, and industrial property
laws may be in violation of international law.
A second and independent countervailing norm to pacta sunt servanda is the concept that a treaty which contravenes a jus cogens is
void and without force.' 8 8 There is much controversy concerning the
origin, existence, and content of a jus cogens.' Indeed, there appears
to be no case in which either an international court or arbitral tribunal
has declared a treaty invalid because it is repugnant to a peremptory
rule of international law. No international political organ has made
any such type of decision; neither has any government agreed to such a
proposition during the settlement of a dispute.' 9
The existence of the concept of a jus cogens, 6r peremptory rule of
international law from which no derogation is permitted, indeed raises
interesting questions. One such jus cogens was recognized during the
conduct of the Nuremberg trials. A jus cogens was found to exist in
the rule of international law prohibiting employment of prisoners of
war in work having a direct relation to war operations (e.g., manufacture, supply, or transport of arms or munitions).' 9 ' It may also be contended that the prohibition against genocide has risen to the level of a
jus cogens. Few crimes seem more heinous than the crime of genocide.
It would be incredible to uphold the validity of a treaty which condoned or provided for the genocide of a people. Few agreements
would be more shocking to the conscience, violative of international
public policy, or contra bonos mores."'
The subject of a jus cogens was addressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 53 of the Convention states a
number of requirements regarding jus cogens. The article defines a jus
187. An additional requirement of the Vienna Convention concerning invocation
of rebus sic stantibus is the fact that the fundamental change not be the result of a
breach of an obligation under that treaty by the party invoking the doctrine. Vienna
Convention, supra note 169, art. 62, para. 2(b).
188. Id. art. 64.

189.
7 GA. J.

See, e.g., Whiteman, Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, with a ProjectedList,
INT'L

& COMp. L. 609 (1977).

190. Schwelb, Some Aspects of InternationalJus Cogens as Formulatedby the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 949-50 (1967).
191. 9 TRIALS OF THE WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1950).

MILITARY

192. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention [19511 I.C.J.
15, at 23, cited in Schwelb, supra note 190, at 955.
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cogens, or peremptory norm of international law, as a norm general in
nature, accepted and recognized by the international community as a
whole; this norm must be one from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.' 9 3
It might be proposed that there has, in fact, arisen a new peremptory norm of general international law. The United Nations has been
very active in paving the way for a "New International Economic
Order." The "New International Economic Order" is embodied in
U.N. Resolutions 3201 and 3202.1"' These resolutions, as well as a
number of others, suggest that a number of principles be adhered to in
the conduct of international economic relations. These principles
include sovereign equality, territorial integrity, freedom from coercion,
and sovereignty over natural resources.95 These resolutions also
include the principle of preferential treatment for developing countries
and declare the right of LDC's to gain access to technology and to
develop indigenous technology. 9' 6 Similarly, the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States' 97 calls for the establishment of these principles, as well as the principles of international cooperation and fulfillment, in good faith, of international obligations.' 98 It should also be
noted that article 13 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States provides that proper regard be given to the rights and duties of
holders, suppliers, and recipients of technology.' 99
193. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 53.
194. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
-, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. -)
G.A. Res. 3201,
[hereinafter cited as NIEOI; Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New InU.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
ternational Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, __
- U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
195. NIEO, supra note 194; Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, - U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. -)
-9 U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); See also G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
- U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
17) -, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 3171,
.
) __,
U.N. Doc. _
196. See NIEO, supra note 194; CERDS, supra note 40.
197. See CERDS, supra note 40.
198. Id. ch. 1.
199. Id. art. 13. The declarations of the United Nations do not, in and of
themselves, establish international law. Some states, including Mexico, undoubtedly
viewed the CERDS as constitutional in nature, and hence, obligatory upon the community of nations.

Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection
or Rejection of InternationalLaw?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 297 (1975); Haight, The New

International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, 9 INT'L LAW. 591, 595 (1975). U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, however,
do not have the force of law. No matter how solemnly pronounced, the resolutions are
not law. Id. at 597. See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1973). These resolutions may, however, be considered evidence of customary
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/7

19801

COMMENTS

The contours of this new international economic order are vague
and undefined. While the right of LDC's to develop is stressed in these
resolutions, ' so too are the rights of property holders and the duty to
fulfill international obligations. Those rights emphasized in the
Charter which were not subject to dispute by member states in framing
the Charter were the general rights of sovereignty and well-recognized
concomitant rights (e.g., the right to trade, the right of access to
technology). The specifics of the Charter, however, where they involved preferential treatment, 01 the right to regulate MNC's, and the
right to expropriate property without regard to international law, were
subject to substantial dispute; these "rights" did not receive universal
ratification.20 2 It is, therefore, difficult to arrive at the conclusion that
a jus cogens could have arisen within the meaning of article 53 of the
Vienna Convention. While the language in the "New International
Economic Order" and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States may be normative in nature, 20 3 and generally applicable, the
norms embodied therein are not recognized as peremptory by the international community as a whole. In fact, it is probably the case that
these norms are not customary jus dispositivum, or pliable rules of
law. The requirements for ordinary customary international law are
not met.20' Whatever the significance of U.N. resolutions, resolutions
passed in the face of substantial opposition cannot create law or
declare dispositively its existence.20 5
Therefore, the conclusion which must follow, is that neither the
Paris Convention nor the New York Convention are invalidated by jus
cogens. While the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus might operate to terinternational law. Collective acts, as well as individual acts of states, constitute state
practice. Collective acts, consistently repeated, may be influential in the creation of international law, if acquiesced in by sufficient numbers of states. This is especially true
if the declarations are normative or declaratory rather than exhortive. See R. HIGGINS,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (1963); Brown, Changing the Rules: International Law and the

Developing Countries: The ABA Workshops of 1977, 12
See also Toth, supra note 161, at 147-48.

INT'L LAW.

265, 269 (1978).

200. See generally NIEO, supra note 194; CERDS, supra note 40.
201. Preferential treatment is simply the principle that nationals of LDC's receive
treatment more favorable than that accorded nationals of developed states. Such treatment may be accorded with respect to patent duration, fees, ownership rights, or
tariffs. See generally Comment, Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for International Economic Relations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Preferential Treatment].
202. See CERDS, supra note 40, reprinted in INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 263 (1975).
203. Preferential Treatment, supra note 201, at 111.
204. See Toth, supra note 161, at 148.
205. PreferentialTreatment, supra note 201, at 111 n.9. See also HIGGINS, supra
note 199, at 2.
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minate the Paris Convention, or modify it, the New York Convention
is not terminated. The exceptions to enforcement embodied within the
New York Convention would be available at any time a rebus sic stan20 6
If the exceptibus claim would otherwise terminate the obligation.
tions would be available, it cannot be claimed that the treaty would
operate to imperil the vital development of a LDC.
Potential investors and licensors need not be concerned over the
theoretical but impractical possibility that LDC's would be quick to
invoke the aforementioned doctrines to escape their liabilities. Revi20 7 Many
sion of existing treaties, however, is a substantial possibility.
LDC's have called for the alteration of the international system of
industrial property protection. The Paris Convention, therefore, is a
prime candidate for revision.
V.

REVISION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION

The revision of the Paris Convention has been entrusted to the

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).2 08 In connection
with its role in studying the impact of transfers of technology on
LDC's, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) has also become involved in the study of the international
patent system.20 The UNCTAD Secretariat has participated in the
ongoing revision process of the Paris Convention by preparing a report
detailing the areas of the Paris Convention that require revision. The
Secretariat has concluded that advantages accruing to LDC's under the
patent regime embodied in the present version of the Paris Convention
are outweighed by the disadvantages.11 0 Indeed, the case for a patent
2 11
system is not universally acknowledged even in developed states.
206. As previously noted, a restrictive interpretation of the public policy exception
of the New York Convention would only permit nonenforcement when basic notions
of morality or justice, or the most important aspects of national policy are threatened.
Imperilment of vital development, a requirement of rebus sic stantibus, should certainly be sufficient to invoke the public policy exception. See notes 144-45 and accompanying text supra.
207. There are political constraints to the invocation of these doctrines. The most
obvious restraint would be the possibility of international retaliation in the form of
reduced foreign aid or trade advantages. Use by LDC's of a "legitimate" and "accepted" method to achieve their goals (for example, revision of treaties) would not be
likely to engender retaliation.
208. See LADAS, supra note 177, at 175. See also UNCTAD Report, Annex IV,
supra note 134, at 6.
209. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 1.
210. Id. at 2.
211. Id. at 2, 3. See also Greer, The Case Against Patent Systems in Less
Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223 (1973).
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In contrast to earlier studies,2" ' the present report has evaluated the
utility of the industrial property system from the perspective of
LDC's. 1 3 From their perspective, the protections against the abuse of
patents, embodied in the Paris Convention, have been diluted; the
patentee has been protected to the exclusion of the social and
2 14
economic interests of LDC's.

In conformance with the continuing awareness of the problems of
LDC's, 2 1 1 changes have been suggested in five basic areas'", of the
21 7
Convention. These areas relate to:
28
1. National treatment; 1
219
2. Right of priority;
22 0
3. Independence of patents;
4. Compulsory licensing and forfeiture;2 2' and

5. Importation of articles and products manufactured by a process

2 22
patented in the importing country.

In view of the recommendations of revision relating to these areas, a
discussion of these principles, their significance, and the rationale for
their revision will follow.
A. National Treatment
The principle of national treatment, embodied in articles 2 and 3 of
the Paris Convention, is, in fact, a form of equal protection. The principle provides that nationals of countries adhering to the Convention,
and others who are domiciled or have an effective industrial or commercial establishment therein, are guaranteed equality of treatment
with nationals of the state granting the patent. 2 3
National treatment, the antithesis of protectionism, is the product
of a consistent pattern of practice among nations during the nineteenth
century. In concluding treaties of friendship, commerce, and naviga212.

See The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 35;

LADAS,

supra note

177, at 171.
213. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 5.

214. Id. at 6.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 7. See also Greer, supra note 211, at 259. Greer advocates abolition of
the patent system in LDC's.
217.

Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 7.

218. See Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 2.
219. Id. art. 4.
220. Id. art. 4 bis.
221. Id. art. 5.
222.
223.

Id. art. 5 quater.
The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 47; Report on the Revision of

the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 25.
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2 2 4 Artificial
tion, countries included such a provision as standard fare.
trade barriers are lifted as a result of such a clause; freer trade and
capital flow may result. Comity is promoted; fractionalism and elevation of parochial interests above the interest in promoting friendly relations is prevented. National treatment provisions may promote a
healthy respect for the rights of others and their status as equals.
The report of the Secretariat, however, addresses the national
treatment guarantees of the Paris Convention in a different light. The
Secretariat levels the criticism that the difference in levels of development and technological capacity between the LDC's and advanced
countries renders the national treatment requirement an instrument of
oppression. " 5 The principle "can be characterized as a reverse system
of preferences in the markets of developing countries for foreign

patent holders.112

6

The Secretariat opines that the principle, rigidly

27 Uneapplied, prevents the adoption of appropriate patent policies.
qual or preferential treatment for local investors has been advocated
by both the Secretariat2 28 and the governmental experts from developing countries. 2 9 The principle of preferential treatment for nationals
of developing states230 finds support in contemporary state practice
and may also appeal to one's sense of social justice. Preferential treatment is justified by the difference in economic situations between
LDC's and developed countries. The problems faced by LDC's are different and more acute than those faced by developed states. It is
argued that preferential treatment is necessary in order to cater to these
problems and to prevent domination of industrial property by
developed states.2 3'
The conclusions drawn by the Secretariat and by the experts from
the group of developing nations are sharply disputed in comments
23 2
The attack on the principle of
issued by the United States expert.

national treatment is countered by him on a number of bases.
Insofar as the differences in position and bargaining strength between local firms and foreign suppliers may affect the ability of local
firms to conduct armslength bargaining, abolition of national treat224. LADAS, supra note 177, at 48; See also Convention of the Establishment,
Nov. 25, 1959, United States - France, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.

225.
226.
227.
patents
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention,
Id.
Id. Such policies might include preferences in
of nationals as compared to that of foreigners.
Id.
UNCTAD Report, Annex IV, supra note 134, at
Preferential Treatment, supra note 201, at 122.
UNCTAD Report, Annex IV, supra note 134, at
UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/7

supra note 176, at 25.

fees paid and duration of
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ment is not the solution. Instead, the "weaker" organization should
hire a technology transfer negotiator or expert to aid or represent it in
negotiations. 3 3 Perhaps the most pointed criticism of the principle of
preferential or discriminatory treatment in this context, however, is
that the principle of preferential treatment is an irrational solution to
the technology transfer problem. A state should encourage local inventiveness."' Differentiation in treatment between local inventions and
foreign inventions can be accomplished consistently with the national
treatment provisions of the Paris Convention; 3 distinctions in treatment based upon the origin of the invention could be utilized to
encourage local research and development activities. This would have
the positive effect of encouraging local invention, thus contributing to
the national economy of the developing country. Access to the new
technology would be fostered as well as local employment. The LDC
would gain exposure to that subsidiary know-how necessary to successfully work the patented product after the patent has expired.
The comments of the United States expert stress that the national
23 ' The
treatment principle is the cornerstone of the Paris Convention.
comments further note that the United States and other developed
member states are also obligated to grant the same treatment to
foreigners that they grant to their own nationals.23 7
The report of the Secretariat, however, does not suggest that the
principle of national treatment should be eliminated. Rather the contention is that the principle should not be "rigidly applied." 2 38 Exceptions to the principle should be acknowledged in the text of the Convention. The Secretariat suggests that such exceptions might include
duration periods of patents,23 9 standards for revocation or compulsory
licensing, 2' ° and fee schedules. 2"' The substantive requirement of
novelty might also be applied differently to national investors than to
foreigners.24 2 The report states that "the revised Convention should
provide for granting preferential treatment for developing countries in
2
some specific areas."

43

233. Id. at 7. UNIDO asserts, however, that LDC's may lack even the expertise to
choose their advisers properly. National Approaches, supra note 2, at 13.
234. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 21.
235. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 26.
236. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 22.
237. Id.
238. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 25.
239. Id. at 26.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 25. For example, a national of the LDC might be required only to prove
local novelty, while a foreigner might be held to a world-wide standard.
243. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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Potential patentees should note, however, that the Secretariat concedes that elimination of the national treatment principle is not absolutely necessary in order to effect transfers and acquisitions of
technology.14 4 Accordingly, an LDC may provide for two types of
patents; one for inventions made abroad and one for local
inventions. 4 5 Such a distinction would accomplish the policy objectives of encouraging local invention and of providing greater protection.2 4 6 Stricter rules of working and novelty for foreign inventions
could be applied.24 7 Under this approach, foreigners would also be
eligible for patents pertaining to local inventions. The effect of this
approach, however, would be that more of the research activity would
take place in the LDC; thus inventions more appropriate to the conditions of the state would result.14 8 This approach would not violate the
national treatment provisions of the Paris Convention because there
would be no discrimination based upon nationality of an investor or
patentee.
B. Right of Priority
The right of priority under article 42 9 of the Convention is an
important protection for the patentee. The priority period for a patent
is twelve months, and for a trademark, six months. During the priority
period the right of a foreign patentee or trademark owner cannot be
cut off or invalidated by acts performed during the interval, such as
publication or working of the invention, or another application. 5 0
The right of priority relieves an inventor from the obligation of filing contemporaneous patent or trademark applications in all the countries in which he desires protection. The inventor will thereby be permitted to apply first in the state in which he resides or conducts
business. During the priority period, the inventor will be in a position
to ascertain the possibilities afforded by his invention or trademark
and decide whether to register in another country. In the meantime, his
right of priority will protect him from intervening events so long as he
registers within the priority period; the inventor will be protected from
2 51
invalidation.
244. Id. at 25. See also The Role of the Patent System, supranote 2, at 48; LADAS,
supra note 177, at 266-68.
245. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 26.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 4.
250. LADAS, supra note 177, at 272.
251. Id.
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The report of the UNCTAD Secretariat advocates a reduction in
the priority period for patents.2 52 In justification of such a reduction,
the Secretariat notes that the priority right originated in the 1883 version of the Paris Convention. 2 3 At that time the means of communication were more tedious than they are today. Even so, the priority
period was originally limited to six months.25 4 At present, the means of
communication are much more effective, thus eliminating some of the
need for an extended priority period.
The Secretariat also points out that the rights of third party
national inventors are impaired by a priority period. For example, if
an invention identical to the protected invention were independently
made by a national inventor during the priority period, the national
inventor would be unable to patent the invention. Thus, there emerges
a risk that this situation may constitute a strong disincentive for the
national inventor; investments of time and money may, according to
this theory, become useless due to an application made in another
country, but as yet unknown to nationals. The third party may unexpectedly be required to stop using his invention.25 5 The report also suggests that this problem might be aggravated if foreign applicants
choose to deliberately delay the filing of their application until the last
month of the convention year; accordingly, the period of validity of
the foreigner's patent would be extended.25 6 The Secretariat, therefore,
makes the following suggestions:
257
1. The priority period should be reduced;
2. The priority period should not apply against third parties who
have, in good faith, begun the exploitation of an invention
upon which priority is claimed before its publication or
25 8
disclosure;
3. Preferential treatment could be granted to developing countries with regard to the rights of nationals who may, in good
faith, apply for a patent during the priority period claimed by
a foreign applicant;2 5 9 and
4. "Preferential treatment could also be examined with respect to
duration of the priority period, for inventions originating in
developing countries."260
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 21.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The comments of the United States expert, however, cast doubt
upon the efficacy and desirability of such revisions. The United States
expert notes that the Secretariat has argued that the priority rights constitute a strong disincentive for local inventors to conduct research and
development activities in developing countries. Carried to its logical
extreme, the conclusion would be that the existence of patent rights of
any kind "discourages research and development activity since
somebody always has the possibility of being second. 2 6' This line of
reasoning, however, is specious since it rarely occurs that two applications for the same invention are filed in a one year time span.216 In the
United States, for example, over 100,000 patent applications are filed
annually; yet fewer than 400 cases arise in a year
where there are con63
flicting applications for the same invention.
As to the contention that foreign patentees deliberately wait until
the end of the priority period before filing their applications, there are
countervailing considerations that render this claim a misstatement.
Delaying the application in this manner would not increase or lengthen
the period of validity of the patent. The patent merely runs from the
later date. Prior to the time a patent is applied for, protection for an
invention does not begin; therefore, the invention may be practiced by
anyone.264
Moreover, the priority period may be used to determine the market
potential in various countries in order to decide where a patent application should be filed; the priority period may also be utilized to effect
other preparations for patenting and marketing a product. 65 Additionally, a reduction in the priority period would probably have the
effect of increasing the number of unworked patents in developing
countries. 266
C. Independence of Patents
The principle of independence of patents found in article 4 bis of
the Convention essentially provides that the substantive requirements
for patents in one country are independent of the requirements and
conditions for patents of the same invention for other members of the
67
Paris Union.
The report of the UNCTAD Secretariat highlights some of the
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.

LADAS, supra note 177, at 272.
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disadvantages of the principle of independence of patents.26 8 Application of the principle leads to the result that forfeiture of a patent in
one country (e.g., for non-payment of taxes) does not cause the
forfeiture of a patent obtained in another country of the Union.
Similarly, expiration of a patent in one country does not mean that the
patent obtained in another country has expired.2" 9 This is true of other
causes of nullity or forfeiture and is also true with respect to conditions for the grant of a patent. 7 °
The Secretariat notes that in some instances the principle will have
an unfavorable impact on the patent grantor, especially when it is an
LDC. For example, an application that has been rejected in one country of the Union for lack of novelty, for obviousness, or for lack of
industrial applicability, may enter or remain in force in another country with similar substantive requirements. 27 ' This disadvantage is
magnified in those LDC's which lack the technical staff required to
engage in a searching examination of an application.27 2 In order to
remedy this deficiency, the Secretariat suggests that a system of compulsory exchange of information should be established; the country
wherein the initial application was made should be required to inform
other countries of the results of its examination. 21" This requirement
would be especially valuable where the country in which the initial
application was made is a country with a developed'system-of patent
examinations. 24 The report also suggests that litigation results on the
validity of patents should be forwarded.2 "5
With respect to this problem, the expert from the United States
does not differ greatly with the UNCTAD Secretariat. It is pointed
out, however, that any requirement with respect to compulsory
exchange of information should be drafted carefully, so as not to require exchange of information which would be irrelevant due to differences in the laws of the concerned states. 6 Thus, the United States
suggests that only information upon which novelty and obviousness
268. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 22-24.
269. LADAS, supra note 177, at 272.
270. Id.
271. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 22.
272. Bolivia, for example, refers to the patent accreditation procedures of the
country of origin when an investor from an advanced country applies for a patent. Exchange of information is particularly helpful in such instances; it provides the LDC
with information material to the grant or denial of a patent which the LDC might not
otherwise be able to acquire. Id. at 22 n.63 and accompanying text.
273. Id. at 23.
274. Id.
275. Id. See also UNCTAD Report, Annex IV, supra note 134, at 7.
276. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 20.
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could be assessed should be exchanged. 7 7 It should be noted that the
present text of the Paris Convention in no way prevents a country
from requiring such information from the applicant.2 78 The suggestions of the United States expert do not differ significantly from those
of the UNCTAD Secretariat on this point.
D. Compulsory Licensing and Forfeiture
The essence of a right to patent inventions lies in the exclusivity of
the right.2 79 In a very real sense, patent rights confer a temporary
monopoly upon the patentee.2 80 The rationale behind the grant of
patent rights has shifted over the years. In the fifteenth through the
eighteenth centuries much of the justification for patent rights centered
upon the right of an inventor to the fruits of his mind. 8 ' Justification
for the grant of patent rights also stemmed from the interest of the
state in promoting inventive activity and obtaining social benefits. 82 In
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the rationale switched from
philosophical considerations to economic considerations. The grant of
exclusive patent rights is not currently justified by any inalienable right
accruing to the inventor. 8 3 Providing a fair reward to an inventor so
as to encourage inventive activity is the current concern of patent laws.
They are also designed to encourage inventors to disclose secrets and
new technology to the public. 84 The efficacy of the patent in achieving
these goals, however, is difficult to measure. 8 5
277. Id. The Patent Office of the United States is not equipped for massive exchange of information. Such a requirement would place a heavy burden on the Patent
Office.
278. Id. In fact, the Canadian Patent Office may require an applicant to submit
the following information:
1. The serial number and filing date of any application for the same invention that
is being, or has been, prosecuted in any other country;
2. Particulars sufficient to identify the prior art cited against the application in the
country involved;
3. The form of the claims allowed therein;
4. Particulars of any application or patent with which such application in the
specified other country is, or has been, involved in conflict, interference, or
similar proceedings.
Id.
279. LADAS, supra note 177, at 2.
280. Id. at 5-6; The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 44, 45; Cohen,
Compulsory Licensing of Inventions - The Paris Convention Model, 20 IDEA 153,
153 (1979).
281. The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 44.
282. Id.; LADAS, supra note 177, at 6-7.
283. The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 44-45.
284. Id. at 45; Cohen, supra note 280, at 153. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
285. See The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 45; Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 2-3. Some commentators have, in
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/7
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Since, however, a patent is an exclusive monopoly right, proper
care must be taken to insure against its abuse. If a patent is obtained,
but the patented product is not made available, nor the knowledge
provided to the patentor state, much of the justification for a patent
right fails. The benefits of local employment, acquisition of knowhow, and availability of additional types of goods is not obtained. In
fact, such a patent may well impede access to the sought after goods by
creating both local and import monopolies. "86 Two of the essential
protections against the abuse of patent rights are the compulsory
87
license and the revocation of patents for nonuse or insufficient use.
The UNCTAD Secretariat, however, has concluded that the Paris
Convention unduly restricts member states in the use of these protections as well as other remedies. 88
The report of the Secretariat depicts two types of patent abuse
prevalent in LDC's. The first problem is that of non-working or
nonuse of the patent. If patents are to be an instrument for achievement of developmental objectives of LDC's, the patented inventions
must be put to effective use.28 9 The second problem involves the use of
a patent monopoly to charge excessive prices or royalties or to force
other restrictions upon a potential licensee of the patent. 9 The
Secretariat has concluded that article 5(A), paragraph 4 of the Paris
Convention"" renders the compulsory licensing and revocation
remedies unavailing against monopoly abuses. "9"
A number of difficulties confront the use of compulsory licensees
or revocation as a remedy for patent abuse. The first problem is the
time lag in obtaining a compulsory license. No compulsory license may
be granted for insufficient working of the patent, prior to the expiration of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or
three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever is last.
fact, concluded that the patent system is a detriment to LDC's. See, e.g., Greer, supra
note 211, at 259.
286. See Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 5 quater.
287. Cohen, supra note 280, at 153; Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 153; Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra
note 176, at 10; LADAS, supra note 177, at 25; UNCTAD Handbook, supra note 2, at
48-49; Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 404, 406 (1975); Note, Is a Compulsory Patent Licensing
Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S. and Foreign Experience, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1207 (1975).
288. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 9-14. See
also UNCTAD Report, Annex IV, supra note 134, at 6-7.
289. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 9-10.

290. Id. at 9.
291. Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(A), para. 4.
292. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 10, 11.
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If the patent officers are backlogged, or if compulsory licensing proceedings must be handled judicially rather than administratively, the
value of a compulsory license is reduced. 2 93
A second problem with respect to the provisions for compulsory
licensing is the prohibition against the grant of a compulsory license
"if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. 2 94 The
Secretariat urges that this restriction is ill-defined; another more ascertainable standard should be utilized.
A further difficulty in the use of compulsory licenses as a remedial
tool is the potential unavailability of necessary subsidiary know-how
with which to operate the patent. A compulsory license is an involuntary grant by the patentee;2 95 it is, thus, reasonable to assume that
unless disclosure is mandated in some manner, the patentee will not
transfer that subsidiary knowledge necessary to the successful working
of the patent. The patentee's interest is adverse to that of the
licensee.2 96
The Secretariat also criticizes the Paris Convention's limitations on
revocation of patent rights. Under the Convention, no patent may be
revoked except in cases where the grant of compulsory licenses would
not have been sufficient to prevent patent abuses. In any event,
forfeiture proceedings may not be instituted prior to the expiration of
two years from the grant of the first compulsory license. This may
lead, in many instances, to the result that patented technology may not
inure to the benefit of the granting country until the technology has
become outdated or of limited value. 97 The Secretariat further contends that the limitations imposed by article 5(A) "constitute an
the actual workimportant constraint to the possibilities of promoting
2 98
ing of the patent in the granting country.
The position of the UNCTAD Secretariat, however, with respect to
the compulsory licensing provisions of the Paris Convention is subject
to substantial dispute. Admittedly, compulsory licensing provisions
have proved to be of limited value in remedying patent abuses, such as
the failure to work a patent. 99 The reason, however, lies not in the
constraints imposed by the Paris Convention, nor because compulsory
293.

Id. at 11. See also The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 51.

294.
295.

Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(A), para. 4.
Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 12.

297.

Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 12. See

296. Id. See also The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 51.

also Note, Is a Compulsory Patent Licensing Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S.

and Foreign Experience, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1207, 1213-14 (1975).
298. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 12.
299. Id. at 10. See also The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 50.
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licensing is in itself an insufficient remedy; its limited value derives
from the fact that compulsory licensing provisions are rarely enforced.
Compulsory licenses are seldom granted.30 0
The United States expert on the transfer of technology points out
several other deficiencies of the criticisms levelled at article 5. The
grace period for working a patent is important to patentees and also
reflects reality and practical considerations. The United States expert
points out the futility of a policy which demands prompt working at
the penalty of a compulsory license or forfeiture. For example, the
commercial success of penicillin was not accomplished until sixteen
years after its invention."' Experience with the helicopter and even the
ballpoint pen reveals similar results.30 2
It is also urged that article 5 and, indeed, the entire Paris Convention, is extremely flexible and will respond to the needs of LDC's. For
example, each country is free to determine for itself:
1. The substantive criteria for granting patents;30 3
2. Whether to exclude certain subject matter from patentability;30 "
3. Whether to have compulsory licensing for nonworking;30°
4. How to define a failure to work, for the purpose of granting a
compulsory license or revoking a patent;30 6 and
5. Whether to grant compulsory licenses in the public interest.30 7
The report of the UNCTAD Secretariat also calls for a redefinition
of the concept of "legitimate reasons" found in article 5(A) of the
Convention. The report considers the concept an obstacle to local
working and acquisition of know-how.30 8 To the extent, however, that
the report calls for a close definition of the concept of "legitimate
300. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 12; Cohen, supra note 280, at
188; The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 50. But see Note, Is a Com-

pulsory Patent Licensing Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S. and Foreign Experience, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1207 (1975); Henry, Multi-National Practice in
Determining Provisions in Compulsory Patent Licenses, II J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325
(1976-1977).
301. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 12.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 10.
304. Id.
305. Id. See generally Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 5.
306. The Paris Convention does not itself define the term. See Paris Convention,
supra note 16, art. 5. See also The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 51
n.203; Cohen, supra note 280, at 162.
307. The Role of the Patent System, supra note 2, at 50; G. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE
TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL

PROPERTY 70

(1968).

308. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 11;
Cohen, supra note 280, at 186-87.
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reasons," it would accomplish the curtailment of the freedom of
national authorities to lend their own interpretation to the concept.3" 9
The United States expert points out that this effect is inconsistent with
the thrust of the UNCTAD report, which calls for more flexibility for
LDC's. To the extent that a redefinition would narrow the defense, it
"would impose a harsh and arbitrary standard on patentees who, for
valid reasons, had not been able to work their patents." 3 ' The comments of the United States expert propose that such a redefinition
would result in a disincentive to potential patentees to patent their
inventions. The inevitable result would be a reduction in the transfer of
technology to countries utilizing the redefined standard." '
The report of the United States expert evinces an agreement with
the Secretariat that compulsory licensing is subject to certain difficulties. Notably, compulsory licenses may not accomplish local working of a patent because subsidiary technology and know-how is often
required in order to work a patent.3" 2 The United States expert,
however, contends, in effect, that the UNCTAD Secretariat has fundamentally misconceived the efficacy of compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing draws its efficacy as a remedy, not only from the
mandatory transfer of know-how which it accomplishes, but from the
incentive it provides patentees to either work or voluntarily license
their patents.3I 3 The fact that compulsory licenses are rarely issued may
very well speak for the success of the incentive they provide to work
inventions.I"
E. Importation of Articles and Products Manufactured by a Process
Patented in the Importing Country
Article 5(A), paragraph 1 of the Convention provides that no
patent shall be forfeited by virtue of importation by the patentee into
the country granting the patent of articles manufactured in any of the
countries of the Paris Union.3"'
309. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 12-13.
310. Id. at 13.
311. Id. See also Harris, Technology Transfer and IndustrialProperty Protection:
Problems Underlying Various European Patent and Other Conventions, 19 IDEA 215,
226 (1977-1978).
312. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 13.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 12. See also Cohen, supra note 280, at 189.

A new proposal on article 5(A) of the Convention has already been argued upon at

the Preparatory Intergovernmental Committee on the Revision of the Paris Convention. The proposed article would strengthen the hand of LDC's in dealing with
patentees. UNCTAD Report, Annex IV, supra note 134, at 6-7.
315. Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 5(A), para. 1. See also LADAS, supra
note 177, at 273.
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Article 5 quater provides that a patentee shall enjoy, with respect
to imported products manufactured by the patented process, the same
rights he would enjoy with respect to products manufactured in the
host country;3" 6 in other words, where the domestic law would protect
the patentee against domestically produced products, it must also protect him against imported products, even though it is the process and
not the product, which has been patented.
This article does not mandate that any or all processes or products
must be granted patent protection. It does provide, however, that any
such protection which would be granted as against domestically produced products must also apply as against an imported product. The
rights of a patentee may not be circumvented by importing, rather than
producing domestically, a protected product.
The UNCTAD Secretariat, however, has criticized the aforementioned provisions. It is his view that these provisions contribute to the
problem of nonworking of patents.3 17 Importation does not constitute
working of a patent.31 8 The advantages of domestic production do not
obtain when a product is imported. Employment is not created,
workers do not gain experience and know-how, and there is a capital
outflow. The combinative effects of articles 5 and 5 quater are the
creation of an import monopoly as well as a domestic monopoly. 31'9 It
is the Secretariat's view that these articles magnify the problems
associated with nonworking of a patent and should, therefore, be
modified or deleted.
The United States expert does not agree. In the first place, very few
of the world's inventions are patented in LDC's. Most of the inventions patented in other countries are, therefore, available as are the
products derived therefrom. 2 0 Additionally, without the article 5
quater protection against imports, a patentee may be unable to
establish continued local working. Once local working has been
established in a LDC, the ability to exclude infringing imports could
determine the patentee's ability to continue local manufacture."'
It is also difficult to perceive what purpose would be achieved or
benefits received by the deletion of article 5 quater. If a patented product is not worked, it should be licensed or forfeited irrespective of
importation by the patentee. If a patent is sufficiently worked, impor316.
177, at
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Paris Convention, supra note 16, art. 5 quater. See also LADAS, supra note
273-74.
Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 15-18.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 8.
Id. at 16.

Published by eCommons, 1980

152

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

tation by the patentee should not result in forfeiture. While deletion of
article 5 quater and article 5(A), paragraph 1 may encourage local
working in lieu of importation, it may also discourage transfer of
technology in the first instance, by forbidding importation when there
may be a good reason for it. Forfeiture should follow lack of working,
not importation.
F. Other Aspects of the Convention
The study by the Secretariat recommends certain other modifications be considered in a revision of the Paris Convention. The
Secretariat recommends that reservations be permitted,32 ' that patent
arrangements among LDC's be permitted by modifying national treatment requirements,3 23 that the requirements for amendment or revision
of the Convention be modified, and that denunciation and withdrawal
from the Convention be permitted; the only requirement should be a
proper one year advance notification.3 2 The Convention currently permits withdrawal only after a state has been a member for a certain
period of time. These recommendations are among the more significant suggestions and have little chance of acceptance. The United
States expert contests these recommendations as either undesirable or
stale.3 2 '
The five areas in which the Secretariat has elaborated his criticisms
to the Convention are extremely significant to the patentee. In particular the right of priority and the principle of national treatment provide a patentee with the incentives and the necessary flexibility to successfully work his patent. Adoption of the recommendations made by
the Secretariat might well have the effect of creating disincentives for
investors and patentees to-transfer technology to LDC's. The Convention would also be transformed into an instrument of parochialism and
disharmony.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems of LDC's in the economic and technological arenas
are substantial. Technological dependence has impeded growth and the
poverty of many LDC's has not been alleviated. Part of the cause lies
in the monopoly status of MNC's and their actions in monopolizing
technology. In many instances inappropriate technologies have been
transferred to LDC's at high cost.
322. Report on the Revision of the Paris Convention, supra note 176, at 27.
323. Id. at 28.
324. Id. at 29-30.
325. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 177, at 24. These recommendations
have little chance of acceptance because the Paris Convention requires unanimous approval for revisions. See LADAS, supra note 177, at 135-38.
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LDC's have reacted by promulgating restrictive investment,
technology, and industrial property laws to regain control over their
economies and to promote balanced technology transfer and growth.
Mexico's enactments are typical of LDC responses and are, by no
means, the most radical response. These enactments may, however,
create more problems than they solve; international obligations are
implicated and the laws may also create investment disincentives.
Chile's experience in the Andean Common Market is an example of
reconsideration by a LDC of the wisdom of restrictive laws in view of
2 6
the need for foreign investment.
Many commentators and economists have focused upon the
developmental problems of LDC's and have advocated that preferential economic treatment is a solution or an appropriate response.3 2
Preferential treatment, however, has a weak foundation in economic
theory, though it may appeal to one's sense of social justice.3 2
Substantial criticism may be levelled at various agencies of the United
Nations as well as academic economists. Impatient with impartial
systematic inquiry, many have taken on the advocate's role of champion and spokesman for LDC's.129 MNC's, investors, and patentees,
while in many instances culprits in the stagnant economic development
of LDC's, should be regulated in an equitable mainer and in one
which is both economically and theoretically sound. Radical unilateral
changes in the investment scheme of a country and in its intellectual
property system might well create undesired disincentives.
Investors should remain aware of the investment and intellectual
property restrictions of LDC's. Mexico's laws, typical of those of
LDC's, " ° require substantial working of patents and trademarks at the
risk of forfeiture or compulsory license. Most important to the investor, however, are the protections provided by the Paris Convention.
The guarantees of nondiscriminatory treatment, priority rights, independence of patents, and importation rights provide significant protections, especially in a field characterized by high research costs.
326. Chile has withdrawn from the Cartagena Agreement in consequence of both
political changes and unfavorable experience with respect to economic development.
The climate is much more favorable at the present time for foreign investment. See
Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regulation of Foreign
Investment, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138 (1977).
327. Preferential Treatment, supra note 201, at 121.
328. Id. Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721

(1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (Brennan, J., concurring); State of Kerala v. Thomas, [1976] A.I.R.S.C. 490.
329. MYINT, supra note 181, at 16-17.
330. See National Approaches, supra note 2, at 32.
Published by eCommons, 1980

154

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

Changes in the five areas of the Convention discussed in this comafforded patents
ment"' could have a drastic effect on the protections
32
rights.1
property
industrial
other
as well as
It is questionable whether the present attack on the industrial property system by LDC's will serve any useful purpose. Industrial property is undoubtedly a symbol of MNC dominance over foreign investment and MNC economic power. In attacking a symbol of economic
power rather than squarely confronting economic problems, one might
feel better or make political hay; however, no real competitive advantage will be achieved. 333 LDC's should reconsider their strategies and
work together with advanced countries in improving their lots.
Warren Landau
331. See notes 208-320 and accompanying text supra.
332. The proposed revision of the Paris Convention also affects trademark protections. See UNCTAD Report, Annex IV, supra note 134, at 10-14; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat, The Impact of Trademarks on the
Development Process of Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/3 (._,
1977).
333. UNCTAD Report, Annex V, supra note 134, at 2-7.
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